Iran ceasefire talks are now beginning. Had the war continued, Iran’s retaliation might well have threatened the very survival of Gulf civilization itself, while also exposing the limits of U.S. military power and potentially bringing an end to America’s unipolar dominance. The ceasefire has, at least for now, bought everyone some breathing room.

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Even so, this latest attack on Iran was reckless.

Because of heavy wartime information control, the full picture remains unclear. Yet it appears that Israel and countries such as Saudi Arabia have burned through large portions of their air-defense missile stocks and may now be left with fewer options against future waves of Iranian missiles and drones (they are inexpensive and numerous).

Saudi Arabia, in particular, seems to be growing increasingly distrustful of the United States. After inviting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Riyadh reportedly moved to purchase a new types of drone developed by Ukraine—one that has proven highly effective in intercepting Russian drones—and to accept Ukrainian personnel to help operate the system. The logic is straightforward: if it works against Russian drones, it should also work against the Iranian-made Shahed drones on which many of those Russian systems are based.

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Meanwhile, U.S. bases across the Gulf appear to have come under widespread Iranian missile attack, with reports suggesting damage to AWACS aircraft and airborne refueling aircrafts. Washington insists that it secured air superiority over Iran, but without AWACS and refueling aircrafts, no serious sustained air operation is possible. On top of that, even high-speed F-15s has been shot down over Iranian airspace; a true air superiority was hardly established.

Around 2010, Iran acquired the then state-of-the-art Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile system. It is entirely possible that some of those systems remain operational. The United States dispatched three aircraft carriers as well as an amphibious assault ship carrying Marines, yet none of them appears able to cross the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf.

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In this sense, the Iran war has revealed the limits of even a superpower like the United States.

If Saudi Arabia continues to widen its distance from Washington while moving closer to Iran and Turkey, the strategic position of both Israel and the United States could come under real pressure. And should Riyadh decide to accept payment for its crude oil exports in renminbi, the internationalization of China’s currency could accelerate dramatically.

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The real question is whether Trump will realize that his past style of impulsive, overbearing diplomacy has done little except weaken America’s own position. But even if he does, the emotional and strategic distance between NATO countries and Trump’s America is already widening. It increasingly resembles a marriage that still exists on paper, but in spirit has already become a separation.

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Against this backdrop, new forms of international coordination without the United States are beginning to emerge.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, speaking at the January World Economic Forum, argued that Trump’s America has drifted away from the principles of freedom and democracy, and called for greater solidarity among what he described as the “middle powers.” Then, on March 19, under British leadership, the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan issued a joint statement on the Strait of Hormuz.

If South Korea, Australia and other states were brought into such a framework—call it an “Alliance for Freedom and Prosperity”—, and meet whenever crises erupted, even online, issuing coordinated statements, it could become a meaningful force.

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More importantly, countries such as Japan, Britain, and Italy have already begun joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft. It is precisely these overlapping circles of consultation, along with multiple concrete cooperation projects, that can magnify the influence of middle powers.

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True, none of this is a substitute for hard security guarantees. Even “middle powers” remain countries driven by ego, national interest, and domestic politics. They do not align easily. Yet in today’s world, even the so-called great powers—the United States and China included—are losing coherence in their domestic governance.

At the same time, the massive use of drones is steadily eroding the value of traditional weapons system—tanks, aircraft carriers, and other legacy platforms. Young people increasingly avoid military service, not only in Russia and Ukraine, but even in Taiwan. The dollar, too, may eventually lose its role as the world’s reserve currency, yet no one can clearly say what will replace it.

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This is an age of anxiety: something fundamental is changing, old tools are losing their usefulness, and no stable replacement has yet appeared.

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At such a moment, Japan must be especially careful not to repeat the fatal mistake of the prewar era, when one domestic faction—above all the military—acted on its own arrogant assumptions and dug the nation into catastrophe.

At the same time, naïve pacifism alone cannot guarantee national security. A country must retain the means to defend itself and repel aggression. But it must also know where to stop.

The principle sounds simple. In practice, however, it requires a mature public, disciplined yet powerful political leadership, and above all a sense of proportion.

That may be the hardest strategic task of all.