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Author: akiokawato

  • Much Ado About U.S. Imports of Russian Diesel

    On October 9, Trump spoke with Putin by phone. The call was supposed to mark Putin’s birthday on October 7, but the time difference and Putin’s overseas travel pushed it back to the ninth. Trump probably expected that they could agree on—and announce—a date for resuming trilateral talks among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on a ceasefire in Ukraine. There had been an informal understanding that the talks would resume after Russia’s parliamentary elections in mid-September.

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    According to presidential aide Yuri Ushakov, the call lasted an hour and a half. Neither leader wanted to hang up, so Ushakov intervened to get them to put down their phones simultaneously. This account appeared in an October 10 article published by the Strategic Culture Foundation. Yet Putin did not agree to resume the trilateral talks. According to Ushakov, Putin was angry over a series of Ukrainian drone attacks on election day.

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    Although Trump failed to secure a resumption of the talks, he nevertheless obtained—or thought he had obtained—something from Putin that he could sell to voters ahead of the midterm elections: a promise that Russia would export large quantities of diesel to the United States and the rest of the world. The Kremlin’s statement was vague, but according to Trump’s social media post, Russia would export 300,000 metric tons of diesel to the United States immediately, followed by another 500,000 tons later.

    The U.S. Treasury moved swiftly, issuing an authorization that same day allowing imports of Russian diesel and related transactions for six months as an exception to sanctions on Russia. Such prompt action suggests that the groundwork had already been laid.

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    Trump had only just signed the so-called “sanctions bill from hell,” proposed by his close friend, the late Senator Lindsey Graham. The legislation provided for high tariffs on countries importing Russian crude oil. Yet Trump proceeded to do something at odds with his own policy. He was probably under pressure from agricultural regions, where the price of diesel used in tractors and other equipment had surged during the busy farming season.

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    The United States exports diesel, but it also imports it, depending on the season and location. In 2025, imports totaled 57.989 million barrels, according to the Energy Information Administration. Trump’s promised “300,000 tons immediately” amounts to roughly 2.25 million barrels—only about 4 percent of annual imports. Russia sometimes suspends diesel exports during the summer farming season. This year, with its refineries damaged by Ukrainian attacks, it had gone so far as to ban diesel exports from July through the end of October. It probably has little spare export capacity. Ultimately, the agreement seems to have had little more than a brief announcement effect on global diesel prices. U.S. diesel futures fell 5 percent immediately after the call, but by October 16 they had returned to roughly their earlier level, according to The Wall Street Journal and other sources.

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    This diesel export agreement, despite its limited substance, has caused a minor uproar among commentators in Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. Their argument runs as follows: “Trump’s America has abandoned Ukraine in pursuit of its own interests. This recalls the close cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States during World War II. That axis is now being revived.”

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    Russia’s Deteriorating Economy

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    To put it somewhat tongue in cheek, however, Russia, Europe, and the United States may each become politically and economically unstable before NATO itself falls apart.

    Russia’s economy, in particular, has presented an illusion of prosperity fueled by military spending. Yet that very spending has created funding shortages throughout the economy, which is beginning to show signs of reaching its limits. Inflation, which had eased under high interest rates, has picked up again as rates have come down, reaching about 6 percent. Food prices are rising much faster. Even so, the central bank has been reluctant to resume raising rates, knowing that doing so would provoke another outcry from businesses.

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    Despite the military spending boom—or rather, because of the excessive emphasis on military production—economic growth continues to slow, while the fiscal deficit keeps widening. Russia’s government debt is projected to reach about 20 percent of GDP by the end of 2026, and debt servicing costs are expected to account for 8.8 percent of federal spending in 2026. These figures are far more “healthy” than those of Japan, the United States, or Europe. The problem is that Russia has to raise capital at home, where the supply is limited, driving government bond yields sharply higher. In July, the Finance Ministry postponed new government bond auctions: issuing debt at such high yields would inflate future debt servicing costs.

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    Regional finances are also under pressure. The federal government is taking away regional revenue sources while saddling regional governments with expenses such as military recruitment. In 2025, 73 of Russia’s 89 federal subjects ran deficits. With little help from Moscow, a growing number of regional governments have turned to commercial banks to stay afloat. Their outstanding bank loans tripled in 2025 to 676 billion rubles. The current central bank policy rate is 14 percent.

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    The government therefore raised the value-added tax by two percentage points to 22 percent this January, while utility charges, including electricity and gas, rose by as much as 27.9 percent. It has also extracted special payments from highly profitable resource companies and other businesses.

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    Meanwhile, this year’s defense spending is expected to exceed the budget by 40 percent, or 4–5 trillion rubles. Covering this overrun alone would require roughly 4 trillion rubles in additional borrowing.

    Russia’s economy is finding it increasingly difficult to make everything add up around the demands of war.

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    The Ukraine War Is Heading Toward a “Frozen Conflict”

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    In the past, European countries might have chosen to accommodate Russia even at Ukraine’s expense—as they did with the Minsk agreement of 2014. But the war in Ukraine has made Russia a tangible threat to Europe. EU member states and the British government, along with private companies, will therefore continue supporting Ukraine.

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    The United States, too, still has undelivered assistance pledged under Biden. American private companies will also continue helping Ukraine for reasons of their own. The battlefield communications infrastructure provided by SpaceX’s Starlink, along with satellite intelligence, is indispensable to Ukraine’s armed forces. For SpaceX, Ukraine is also a valuable opportunity to collect data on how its technology performs in an actual war. The same applies to Anduril Industries, which has been involved since the early stages of the war, and to Palantir, whose Maven system played a prominent role under former Defense Minister Fedorov.

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    The diesel episode will therefore not produce a U.S.-Russia axis that tramples Ukraine and turns against Europe. Rather than ending abruptly in a comprehensive ceasefire, the war is likely to cool gradually through a series of limited agreements—for example, mutual restraint in attacks on energy facilities—and come to resemble the “frozen conflict” that followed the Minsk agreement of 2014.

  • A World History Free from Both Eurocentrism and Orientalism 11 The Formation of the Modern Nation-State 3

    (A modern nation-state is a massive tax-collection apparatus. Parliament oversees it, while the government and bureaucracy manage its expenditures. The central bank maintains the stability of the currency that underpins domestic economic circulation. Law enforcement agencies guarantee the stability of power and society. The military and intelligence agencies are responsible for national security. And on the international stage, the nation tries to promote practices that serve its own commercial interests as international law. The United Kingdom was the first to accomplish all of this in the most comprehensive manner. In this chapter, we will trace the process by which the various institutions of the modern state took shape in the United Kingdom.

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    The source text is “In Search of Lost Modernity” by Akio KAWATO.

    The English edition of this book (originally written in Japanese) is on

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hiRK7kjbX0Hxd2NOxPqtQlVWgjDHgKCr/edit

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MB0Me9P5Lpa2HGceuJUdMqqQ2CRHQSxa/edit)

    (The copyright belongs to the author, Akio Kawato)

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    The Growth of Bureaucracy in Britain

    In sixteenth-century England, during the reign of Elizabeth I, there were only about 500 paid government officials—265 of them working in customs and finance. Much of the local judicial work was done on a voluntary basis. Britain’s modern bureaucracy began to take shape toward the end of the seventeenth century, driven by the need to rapidly expand its military—especially the navy—in order to fight wars against Spain, the Netherlands, and France.

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    To fund this buildup, Parliament introduced property and consumption taxes, strengthened excise taxes, and began issuing government bonds. Tax collection, which had previously been outsourced to private agents, was brought back under direct government control. By 1688, over 2,500 new officials had been hired for this purpose. In contrast, France continued outsourcing tax collection to private contractors, which led to inefficiencies. When Louis XVI tried to resolve the resulting revenue shortfall through tax hikes, it triggered public outrage and ultimately cost him his life in the French Revolution.

    The British Parliament also established the custom of approving government spending every year. By the 1730s, this practice had evolved into the formal annual “budget.” In 1833, a dedicated department was created under the Chancellor of the Exchequer—forming the foundation of today’s Treasury.

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    By 1714, there were 114 commissioners (equivalent to directors of department) heading 18 government offices. In the 1720s, the number of full-time government employees had reached about 12,000. The fastest growth occurred in revenue-related departments: from 1690 to 1782/83, the number of revenue officials tripled, reaching around 8,300 by the end of the American War of Independence.

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    Even the British Bureaucracy Was a Den of Iniquity at First

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    When you read about it like this, it may sound as if everything developed in the upright and proper manner of a British gentleman—but that wasn’t the case. People are the same everywhere. John Brewer’s “The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783” vividly describes the reality as below. Interestingly, similar patterns also appeared in contemporary Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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    –There was corruption. The labyrinthine state system housed all kinds of characters: deadbeats, parasites, sharks, and “greedy half-bird, half-beast” types. Because it took so long to transfer funds, state money could be diverted into private investments. Taxpayers, litigants, and government suppliers were offered favors in exchange for gratuities, entertainment, or outright bribes. It could take as long as eighteen months for land taxes collected in northern England to reach the Treasury.—

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    Early on, political appointments and personal connections dominated the British bureaucracy, leading to fierce and dirty rivalries among officials. A more structured civil service only began to emerge at the end of the seventeenth century. Civil servants started to receive regular salaries in cash.

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    Still, the idea of lifetime employment and departmental independence was slow to take hold. Government officials often moved between public and private sector jobs—and even between ministries. They relied heavily on the patronage of nobles and politicians, and rarely considered themselves permanent employees of any one department (today’s ministry). When they retired or were dismissed, it was common for them to take the documents they’d been working on—perhaps to keep them from becoming evidence of misconduct.

    In the 18th century, bureaucratic working hours weren’t standardized. Most worked from around 10 or 11 in the morning until 4 in the afternoon. Some who held public titles even paid a portion of their small salaries to agents to perform their duties for them. The 18th-century government was, in one observer’s words, “a strange patchwork of old and new, useless and useful, corruption and loyalty.”

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    However, from the 1690s onward, bureaucracy began to bureaucratize. Offices that set rules and work quotas grew in number. Tasks were assigned more clearly, working hours were standardized, and inter-departmental turf wars intensified—like the ongoing clashes between the Customs and Excise Departments or between the Navy Board and the Admiralty. As rule-based governance expanded, officials became less willing to accommodate citizen requests that didn’t fit neatly into the system.

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    The Development of the British Tax System

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    There’s a saying: “Taxation is the state.” Looking at Britain’s modernization process, this becomes strikingly clear. Without money, there can be no functioning government.

      As described earlier, Britain was relatively heavily taxed. In 1715, taxes amounted to 17% of GDP. By 1800, during the Napoleonic Wars, that figure had risen to 24%—though it fell to 10% by 1850.

    In contrast, France’s tax revenues were only 11% of GDP in 1715, 10% in 1775, and 10% in 1803. But in Britain, only the central government collected taxes. This meant that although national taxes were high, the British public kept more of their income than citizens in countries like France, where lords and the Church levied additional dues.

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    Between 1750 and 1800, indirect taxes—like excise duties—made up more than 70% of British tax revenue. This system was easier to manage than income tax, since the government collected money from a relatively small number of merchants and distributors rather than from individuals.

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    In France, by contrast, the tax rate was lower, but feudal dues and Church levies took a large toll. Furthermore, national tax collection was outsourced to private contractors, who often embezzled part of the revenue. Where bureaucratic systems are weak, tax collection naturally gets pushed outside—and invites abuse.

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    A similar pattern emerged in medieval Russia under Mongol rule. The Mongols outsourced tax collection to the Grand Duchy of Moscow (one of several self-styled principalities), which siphoned off funds and gradually gained power—eventually driving out the Mongols altogether.

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    In the 18th century, the British East India Company assumed tax collection responsibilities in India. This allowed it to infiltrate local ruling structures and ultimately led to British colonization. Once again, “taxation is the state.”

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    What’s also interesting is how tax revenue was used differently in France and Britain. In France, higher taxes typically strengthened the army. In Britain, they went instead to the navy. In the mid-17th century, some factions in the British Parliament even pushed to abolish the standing army altogether, fearing it would both increase the financial burden and consolidate the king’s power.

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    From Mercenaries to Standing Armies

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    A standing army—military forces maintained by the state, from generals to foot soldiers—is one of the essential features of a modern state. It enabled countries to defend territory and build overseas empires. But keeping this money-devouring machine alive required centralized taxation and a dedicated bureaucracy. In many ways, the rise of the modern state began with the military.

    Let’s look at how early modern Western European states transitioned from using mercenaries to maintaining standing armies.

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    In the 17th century, mercenary armies started evolving into forces under the direct control of kings. A key turning point came with the army of the famous mercenary general Wallenstein, employed by the Holy Roman Emperor during the early years of the Thirty Years’ War. Wallenstein’s independent tax-collection system and private army alarmed the emperor, who eventually had him assassinated and brought both under imperial control.

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    Even so, the Holy Roman Empire never truly developed a strong standing army. This was likely because it effectively dissolved into a patchwork of sovereign states after the Thirty Years’ War. Standing armies instead became prominent in France and Prussia.

    At first, these national armies were still a patchwork of mercenaries simply placed under royal command. Former mercenary leaders became officers reporting directly to the sovereign, and the costs of food, uniforms, and housing were, in principle, paid by the state. All soldiers wore the same government-issued uniforms.

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    But there was still no conscription system. The core of the military was made up of professional soldiers, and the armies relied heavily on foreign recruits. In Louis XV’s French army, foreigners made up about one-eighth of the troops in peacetime, and a full quarter during wartime. In 18th-century Prussia—even under Frederick the Great—foreigners made up about half of the peacetime army. By 1806, more than 1,000 of Prussia’s 7,000–8,000 officers were foreign-born.

    This gave rise to the famous saying: Prussia was not a country with an army—it was an army with a country. And in these armies, regimental and company commanders still held considerable autonomy. Many continued the medieval mercenary tradition of enriching themselves by pocketing their companies’ expenses.

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    Expansion of Army Size

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    In 16th-century Europe, military tactics began to change. Firearms started to be used on a large scale, and armies increasingly relied on massed infantry firepower instead of cavalry. British historian Andrew Roberts notes that “in the second half of the 16th century, Philip II of Spain ruled Europe with an army of 40,000 men, but by the 17th century, Louis XIV of France needed 400,000.” This massive expansion of armies led to the use of questionable recruitment tactics—such as getting young men drunk in taverns and enlisting them without their knowledge—and to the gradual development of farmer-based militia systems.

    In France, the King’s Militia System was established in 1688. In Prussia, the Canton System began in 1732, assigning each regiment to a specific district (or canton) for recruitment. Desertion was harshly punished.

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    Still, as mentioned earlier, the backbone of standing armies remained professional and volunteer soldiers. Many craftsmen, farmers, and servants volunteered to serve for a few years, and by 1716, such volunteers made up about 85% of the total force. In the German states as well, soldiers typically served multi-year terms. Since there weren’t enough military barracks, they were often quartered in private homes in nearby towns.

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    As mentioned above, foreign mercenaries continued to play a role in national armies. The British famously used German mercenaries in the American War of Independence. Spain employed Swiss, Irish, and other mercenaries until the early 19th century. Even Napoleon used foreign troops. In some battles, Swiss mercenaries ended up fighting each other on opposite sides.

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    The British Regular Army

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    As a unique case, let’s consider the British Army. In the 17th century, Britain stayed out of the Thirty Years’ War, and—as previously mentioned—Parliament opposed creating a standing army, fearing it would strengthen royal authority.

    Nonetheless, Britain’s army expanded. In the latter half of the 17th century, King James II, hoping to create an absolutist regime like Louis XIV’s France, increased the standing army to 40,000—four times its previous size. His successor, William III, who came from the Netherlands and used the British military in campaigns against France, further strengthened the army. The cost reached £5 million annually, prompting increases in customs duties and consumption taxes, and the introduction of a land tax in 1692. John Brewer’s “The Sinews of Power”  vividly describes the situation as follows:

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    –Between 1680 and 1780, both the British Army and Navy tripled in size. Over that century, Britain fought the Nine Years’ War (1688–97), the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), the War of Jenkins’ Ear and the War of the Austrian Succession (1739–48), the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), and the American War of Independence (1775–83).–

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    During the Nine Years’ War, the British Army reached a peak of 87,500 men. For the first time, it surpassed 100,000 during the American War of Independence. However, the composition of the army varied greatly from time to time, with professional soldiers and foreign mercenaries making up the majority. During the American War of Independence, German mercenaries also joined the British army.

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    Although troop levels were reduced in peacetime, many soldiers were stationed in Ireland—and the costs were shouldered by Irish taxpayers. In this way, a standing army was maintained outside of direct parliamentary oversight.

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    Between 1739 and 1763, foreign mercenaries received £17.5 million—about 21% of the army’s budget. In the War of the Spanish Succession at the start of the 18th century, Britain not only employed mercenaries but also funded its allies’ forces.

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    The Navy was equally powerful. During the wars against Louis XIV, its manpower reached about 40,000 and eventually exceeded 100,000. The total tonnage of British warships doubled between 1714 and 1760.

    Moreover, until 1858—when India came under direct royal rule—the British East India Company maintained its own army. By 1800, this “Company Army” numbered 200,000 men, more than twice the size of Britain’s domestic army. Most officers were British, while most rank-and-file soldiers were Indian.

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    In summary, although Britain did not adopt conscription—doing so only in 1916 during World War I—it still fielded a military force strong enough to maintain a global empire. In many ways, the modern state emerged first and foremost as a war machine.

    Police and Intelligence: “Agencies of Power”: Police and intelligence agencies are also essential pillars of modern governance. Because they wield coercive power, in Russia they are collectively known as the “organs of power,” alongside the military. These agencies report directly to the president, bypassing the prime minister. In countries with underdeveloped economies, raw power often becomes essential for maintaining national unity.

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    In Western literature, the power of these institutions is often highlighted—for instance, Inspector Javert in Les Misérables by Victor Hugo represents the force of the French police and Ministry of the Interior.

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    After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the Ministry of Home Affairs of Japan and its affiliated police agencies were dismantled, giving the appearance of decentralization, and the intelligence agency was completely abolished. As a result, modern Japanese citizens tend to underestimate the influence of the police—except, perhaps, for the tax office.

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    But politics cannot run on beautiful ideals alone. Sometimes, suppressing opponents or intimidating troublemakers is necessary—and in those moments, the “agencies of power” become extremely useful.

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    The Central Bank: The Nation’s Accountant

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    The central bank also emerged as a vital institution in modern governance. Its early role was essentially to help finance war by selling government bonds. To do so effectively, it had to keep market interest rates low; otherwise, the cost of repaying national debt would soar. In this way, the central bank’s mission became the stabilization of interest rates—that is, controlling inflation.

    Government debt was not a new idea.

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    Cities in the medieval Mediterranean had already issued similar instruments as official bonds, and some even had proto-central banks to manage them. In Venice, a system of perpetual annuities allowed the government to collect money from wealthy citizens in exchange for lifetime interest payments. Collected money was often used to fund wars.

    The concept of the annuity likely evolved from practices dating back to the Crusades, when kings and nobles mortgaged land to raise funds, pledging a share of their land revenues to creditors as annuities (or rentes). In Venice, these annuities were tradable assets. However, between their introduction in the 12th century and 1500, their market value had fallen by half. The original interest rate was around 5%.

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    The Venetian institutions that handled these payments began as the Monte Vecchio, then evolved into the Monte Nuovo and finally the Monte Nuovissimo. These can be seen as early forms of central banks. Genoa’s Casa di San Giorgio, founded in 1407, served a similar role.

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    In France, King François I created government bonds (rentes) backed by revenue from the Paris City Hall in 1522. Spain also issued national bonds in the 15th century, known as juros (or flos), backed by portions of royal revenue. German merchants like the Welsers and the Fuggers were major buyers—until their bankruptcy.

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    After that, large Genoese merchants stepped in and subscribed to vast quantities of Spanish bonds. These were traded in Besançon and, after 1579, in Piacenza. In the 17th century, Amsterdam took over as Europe’s primary bond trading hub.

    In the 17th century, the Netherlands and, later, Britain began issuing government bonds and selling them to the Bank of England to raise funds. Britain used this money to wage wars against France and other powers.

    France, on the other hand, failed to establish a central bank. Its attempt to finance wars through ever-increasing taxation instead led to the French Revolution of 1789.

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    In the 19th century, the Bank of England became a stabilizing force for an economy that had expanded dramatically due to the Industrial Revolution. Its responsibilities grew to include auditing private banks, maintaining credit, and providing emergency support during financial crises.

    In 1844, the Bank of England was granted a monopoly on issuing banknotes. The value of these notes was backed by gold. While this system prevented inflation by limiting the amount of currency in circulation, it made deflation more likely. If exports declined, the economy would contract. This rigidity contributed, as mentioned earlier, to Britain’s prolonged economic slump in the second half of the 19th century, especially between 1873 and 1896.

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    FRB as a product of “conspiracy” at Jekyll Island

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    In the United States, a full-fledged central bank did not emerge until the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. At the time of American independence, the power of the individual states was strong, and many issued their own banknotes as if they were sovereign nations. However, the Constitution designated the dollar as the national currency, so states could not freely print unlimited amounts of it. Regulations, including gold reserve requirements, limited currency issuance. For large-scale transactions within and between states, bills of exchange were also commonly used. Even today, dollar bills are printed at six regional Federal Reserve Banks, which determine issuance volumes individually—though nationwide interest rates are unified, so the volume of currency is adjusted accordingly.

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    Several early attempts to establish a central bank in the U.S. failed. The Bank of North America (1781), the First Bank of the United States (1791), and the Second Bank of the United States (1816) were all short-lived, partly due to opposition from states determined to preserve their monetary autonomy.

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    Nevertheless, the U.S. entered a period of rapid economic expansion in the late 19th century, known as the “Gilded Age,” without a central bank. This era saw repeated financial crises. Currency values would plummet, sparking bank runs, sudden gold shortages, and the collapse of private banks.

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    Initially, powerful financial groups like the Morgan conglomerate stepped in to rescue failing banks, but even these giants grew reluctant to bear the burden alone. In November 1910, Senator Nelson Aldrich, Assistant Treasury Secretary Andrew Piatt, and representatives of five major banking houses—including Morgan, Rockefeller, and Kuhn Loeb—met secretly at Jekyll Island, a resort in the American South.

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    Together, they drafted a proposal for the Federal Reserve System. The key architect was Paul Warburg, a German-Jewish émigré and expert in European central banking. A bill based upon their proposal passed Congress in 1913, and President Woodrow Wilson signed it into law. As its origins suggest, the Federal Reserve was originally designed more as a mutual assistance institution for private banks than a full-fledged government bond underwriter.

    During the Great Depression, which began in 1929, the Federal Reserve initially tightened monetary policy to cool the economy, but later reversed course and began easing credit to encourage recovery. During World War II, it played a major role in financing the war by purchasing large quantities of Treasury-issued bonds.

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    That said, many countries have functioned—at least temporarily—without a central bank. Even the United States fought the Civil War, the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the subsequent suppression of the Philippine independence movement without one. During the Civil War, the Union government issued various forms of “greenbacks”—paper money not backed by gold—to cover war expenses. At first, this led to inflation, but in 1879 the government ceased new issuance and made the existing paper currency convertible into gold, thereby stabilizing prices. This was only possible because the economy was growing.

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    Today, central bank’s role has expanded from stabilizing interest rates and preserving the currency’s value to maintaining employment and supporting the economy. In the United States, this dual mandate is enshrined in law. But these goals can be contradictory. For instance, fighting inflation typically requires raising interest rates—yet doing so too aggressively can slow the economy and reduce jobs. In Japan, employment is not a formal responsibility of the Bank of Japan, but strong public and political pressure ensures that economic conditions are still taken into account.

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    “International Law,” “Comparative Advantage,” and “Free Trade”: Rules Made by the Strong

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    The term “international law” may sound lofty, but in reality it’s just a set of rules born out of conflict between modern nation-states. In practical terms, when the dominant power of the era declares, “This is how the rules of navigation should be,” others follow—and before long, it becomes accepted as global “law.” Unlike domestic legal systems, international law lacks a constitution, civil or commercial code, or enforcement bodies like police and prosecutors. The International Criminal Court, created in 2003 to prosecute war criminals, lacks the authority to arrest or extradite anyone to its headquarters in The Hague.

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    Modern international law began taking shape in the 17th century as nations of relatively equal strength competed for overseas influence. In 1609, Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius published “Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas)”, arguing that the oceans should be open to all nations for trade.

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    While it appears to be a scholarly treatise, in reality, it was a demand that the Netherlands be granted access to the spice trade routes in Southeast Asia, which were monopolized by Spain and Portugal. Grotius cleverly wrapped his argument in Roman legal concepts like dominium (ownership) and imperium (sovereignty), earning him the title “father of international law” and giving birth to what is now called jus gentium—the law of nations.

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    Terms like “free trade” and “comparative advantage” may sound equally impartial, but they too are tools used by powerful countries to serve their interests. “Free trade” essentially means a system of trading goods without tariffs. While the idea seems elegant in theory, it was invented by industrialized nations like Britain to secure export markets for the surplus goods produced during the Industrial Revolution. It became a kind of spell that powerful countries cast over developing ones. If taken at face value, developing nations would never be able to cultivate their own industries.

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    The “principle of comparative advantage” was developed by David Ricardo to justify the liberalization of trade—especially around the time of the Methuen Treaty between Britain and Portugal in the early 18th century. The theory is simple: Portugal is better at producing wine; Britain is more efficient at manufacturing goods. If each country focuses on its strength and trades with the other, both will prosper.

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    In reality, however, Portugal remained locked in the role of an agricultural exporter, and British capital eventually came to dominate its wine industry. In other words, free trade and comparative advantage often lead to the economic powers monopolizing the most profitable sectors of the global market.When I served as ambassador to Uzbekistan, I saw firsthand how European ambassadors invoked this outdated theory to pressure local bureaucrats. But a country that only produces wine will never achieve widespread prosperity.

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    After the defeat in World War Ⅱ Japan broke away from the production and export of low-margin miscellaneous goods and entered the automobile manufacturing industry, where it did not have a comparative advantage. There, it enjoyed the benefits of “free trade” led by the United States, expanded exports, and achieved a rapid rise in living standards. Even today, it is in Japan’s national interest to continue to fly the banner of free trade (with restrictions maintained in a few areas), but it is important to fully understand what this means and what you are actually saying.

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    Even now, international law does not govern all aspects of global politics and economics. Although the UN Charter sets the framework for political relations, the frequent use of veto power in the Security Council often prevents decisive action. And even when resolutions are passed, the UN lacks the military power to enforce them. In practice, the only areas where international law has real teeth are in limited areas like maritime law and select treaty-based rules. The principle that “international law reflects the balance of power at any given time” remains unchanged from the beginning of history.

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    The United States, as a global superpower, is deeply resistant to international oversight. This is partly because it is powerful, and partly because many international institutions were created under U.S. leadership after World War II. That resistance has intensified under President Donald Trump, who was re-elected in 2024. His push to raise tariffs could effectively dismantle the World Trade Organization (WTO)—an institution that grew out of the U.S.-backed General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) after WWⅡ. In this sense, international law stands today at a major turning point.

  • AI Says: Ukraine Is Becoming a Modern Hundred Years’ War

    Akio KAWATO

    The war in Ukraine has now lasted four and a half years since Russian forces invaded in February 2022. That alone makes it longer than World War I, which lasted a little over four years and three months. But the conflict actually began when Russian troops seized Crimea in March 2014, so it has already been going on for twelve and a half years.

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    Recently, I explored some near-term scenarios with ChatGPT. It concluded: “The most likely situation in Europe two years from now is an inconclusive one—an ‘armed truce’ with no formal peace agreement, in which large-scale ground fighting subsides along a front line close to the present one, while drone and missile strikes and localized fighting continue. The probability of this outcome is 40 percent.”

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    Consider fourteenth-century Europe. England’s ruling dynasty, whose roots lay in Normandy in France and whose ancestry was Norman—that is, Viking—claimed the French throne on the grounds of its family ties to the French royal house. War broke out in 1337. Joan of Arc later entered the picture, both countries experienced domestic turmoil, and fighting continued intermittently until around the peace treaty of 1492.

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    Of course, England and France were not yet modern states with clearly defined borders. The Hundred Years’ War was partly a struggle over territory between two royal dynasties. But insofar as England sought to impose its rule by force on the grounds of kinship, it resembles today’s Russia, while France resembles Ukraine. Curiously, both England’s Plantagenet dynasty and today’s Russians have Viking ancestry. Perhaps we should blame the Viking blood.

    .

    No One Knows the Full Truth on the Battlefield

    .

    Since the war began, one month we hear that Russia has the upper hand, the next that Ukraine has suddenly gained the advantage, and the month after that, no, Russia is ahead again. There seems to be no end to it.

    Even the senior military commanders on both sides probably cannot fully grasp what is actually happening along the front. There have been reports of Russian forces advancing in large numbers after accepting reports from their own units that a particular location had been captured, only to come under Ukrainian attack and suffer badly. Apparently, small Russian units sometimes slip into enemy territory and report that they have secured it, even though they have done no more than infiltrate the area.

    .

    Weapons are evolving constantly. It is the familiar contest between spear and shield. One month, Ukraine steps up its drone attacks. The next, Russia develops countermeasures and strikes Ukraine with its own missiles and drones. Then Ukraine develops defenses of its own and equips its cruise missiles and drones with systems that can evade Russia’s defenses, particularly electronic jamming. The following month, Russia responds again—and so it goes.

    Russia is now using jet-powered drones to carry out attacks almost at will.

    Small jet engines can be purchased in China for less than $50,000, according to the September 14 edition of The Wall Street Journal. But Ukraine has also begun deploying weapons to shoot them down.

    .

    In identifying targets inside Russia, guiding weapons to them, and countering Russian jamming, Ukraine receives support from military and intelligence agencies in the United States and other countries, as well as from private companies.

    With this basic understanding in mind, let us look at several recent developments.

    .

    Russia’s IT-Based Autocracy Is Now Fully in Place

    Since Putin became president in 2000, much of the Soviet style of authoritarian rule has returned. Yet some room for freedom remained. When he ordered mobilization in September 2022, for example, more than 300,000 young Russians fled abroad. Putin had not declared martial law nationwide, so they were free to leave.

    .

    The results of Russia’s parliamentary election on September 18–20, however, suggest that something has changed. The world of George Orwell’s novel 1984, it seems to me, has become fully realized in Russia in 2026. What do I mean?

    Before the election, a May poll by VTsIOM put support for the ruling party, United Russia, at only 27 to 34 percent. Yet it won more than 55 percent of the vote. It now controls more than two-thirds of the seats, leaving the government free to amend the constitution or do virtually anything else it wishes.

    .

    Young Russians probably can no longer ignore a summons from the military recruitment authorities and escape abroad. Information that they have failed to report is presumably passed to passport-control officers at the border. If they try to leave, they will likely be stopped.

    .

    Over the past few years, using the internet and smartphones for everything from paying taxes to ordering groceries has become routine in Russia. People can even enter the subway using facial recognition. Society has become as convenient as those in the West, perhaps more so. But this digitization, which relies heavily on Chinese equipment, has also enabled the government to monitor individuals’ movements and activities in real time.

    Chinese-made surveillance cameras are installed throughout the streets, continually identifying the faces of passersby. If people hold an antigovernment gathering, facial recognition can probably produce a list of participants almost immediately. The ultimate “IT-based autocracy,” in which the state uses technology to monitor and control each individual citizen, is now fully in place.

    .

    A Generational Change in Ukraine’s Defense Leadership

    In the second half of July, the dismissal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov caused turmoil within Ukraine. Fedorov had no military background but was well versed in information technology. After becoming defense minister in January, he worked with Alex Karp, CEO of the American company Palantir, to greatly expand drone attacks on Russia. These produced striking results: attacks on oil-loading facilities on the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in March, followed in June by a series of strikes on oil refineries, including one on the outskirts of Moscow.

    Yet on July 15, Fedorov was abruptly dismissed. There was much speculation about the reasons, but Fedorov himself explicitly said that his emphasis on drones, and his diversion of funding away from conventional weapons, had antagonized certain interests. That is probably true.

    .

    The selection of his successor involved considerable wrangling. On August 19, Zelensky appointed Yevhen Khmara, acting head of the Security Service of Ukraine. Khmara had led the service’s military component. Simultaneously commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, whose frequent disagreements with Fedorov had impeded the smooth conduct of operations, also retired. He was replaced by Mykhailo Drapatyi, who works well with the new defense minister.

    Unlike Syrskyi, who came up through the Soviet military, Drapatyi belongs to a new generation of officers. He is said to be capable of adjusting operations quickly as circumstances change and delegating authority to commanders in the field. Similar assessments have been made of Khmara, too.

    .

    Zelensky thus appears to have used the internal dispute to remove both Fedorov, who relied excessively on drones, and Syrskyi, who remained wedded to Soviet-era methods of warfare. By removing both sides in the quarrel, he created a leadership structure capable of fighting more flexibly. Reports have begun to emerge that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian troops back in eastern Ukraine.

    .

    Ceasefire Talks Set to Resume

    Efforts toward a ceasefire continue. Western media were stirred when CIA Director John Ratcliffe flew from Washington to Moscow via Riga on August 25 aboard a large C-17 military transport aircraft, spent seven hours in the Kremlin, and returned home.

    There was considerable speculation. Had he detected preparations by Putin to use nuclear weapons and gone to stop him? Had he gone to dissuade Putin from attacking NATO? The details of the visit remain unknown, however, and the episode has already largely faded from public attention.

    .

    It is unclear how closely this was connected to the visit by presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Russia on September 5. They met with Putin and proposed resuming the trilateral ceasefire talks among the United States, Ukraine, and Russia that had been suspended since February.

    They then traveled directly to Ukraine—their first visit there, despite having worked on ceasefire negotiations—and obtained Zelensky’s agreement to resume talks. Negotiations will probably restart soon.

    .

    In addition, Kyrylo Budanov, formerly the head of military intelligence and now Zelensky’s right-hand man as chief of the presidential office, has contacts with Igor Kostyukov of Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. According to the September 4 edition of The New York Times, Budanov appears to have held discussions with the Russian side in Geneva before Russia’s parliamentary election and worked out a detailed ceasefire plan. Those discussions, too, will probably resume before long.

    Still, Putin presumably believes that intensifying military operations could win him more territory. It is hard to imagine him agreeing to a ceasefire now. At the very least, there is unlikely to be any movement before the U.S. midterm elections in November.

    .

    Could Europe’s Rising Far Right Be a Game Changer?

    .

    Ukraine now relies on the European Union for much of its financial support. The EU has pledged €90 billion over two years. Particularly significant is the determination of Germany’s Merz government to strengthen national defense, even by issuing more government debt, and to increase support for Ukraine as well.

    .

    But the rise of far-right forces across Europe could change this picture dramatically. Many of these groups take a pro-Russian position, so their willingness to continue supporting Ukraine is uncertain. During the period when advocates of “regime change” within the U.S. Democratic Party wielded considerable influence, Russia sought to counter them by cultivating ties with far-right groups in the EU, providing funding and inviting their members to Moscow. Germany’s far-right AfD is a particularly consequential force among them.

    .

    NATO, or the transatlantic alliance, is said to protect Europe from Russia. But when it was founded in 1949, it also had the task of guarding against a resurgence of Nazi Germany. Its purpose, in the words of its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, was to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

    If Germany therefore joins forces with Russia along the lines advocated by the AfD, while Trump’s United States abandons Europe, NATO will fall apart.

    .

    Eventually, Conflicts Wear Themselves Out

    .

    While browsing Facebook, I came across an amusing video posted by a Russian acquaintance, an elderly, bohemian cultural figure. Without mentioning Ukraine at all, he simply kept repeating: “Well, this thing … it will end. … Someday it will end … What a mess …Hmm? No, it will end … Someday it really will end.”

    .

    Since the Korean War armistice of 1953, the “armed truce” described by ChatGPT at the beginning of this article has already lasted 73 years. Cyprus, contested by Greece and Turkey, remains effectively divided into north and south. The British navy still maintains a presence in Gibraltar to defend British sovereignty there.

    .

    Setting aside arguments about sovereign statehood for the moment, the first priority should be to enable the people who live in these places to lead decent lives. Thomas Graham, an expert at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, has suggested that peace in Ukraine may be achievable only through “multiple, phased agreements,” with the territorial question receding into the background (The National Interest, September 4). Presumably, he means that peace could emerge in practice through a series of specific agreements: stopping attacks on ports, railroads, warehouses, refineries, and power plants; separating forces at particular locations; and restoring water and electricity supplies.

    .

    Budanov, the chief of the presidential office mentioned above, has also raised the possibility of an arrangement for Ukrainian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine involving either a body modeled on the “Board of Peace” that Trump established for Gaza, or joint Russian-Ukrainian administration with outside forces stationed there (The New York Times, September 4).

    No armed conflict lasts forever. Eventually, it wears itself out.

  • A World History Free from Both Eurocentrism and Orientalism 10 The Formation of the Modern Nation-State 2

    (The modern state did not emerge only in Britain. Let’s compare Britain’s path with that of France.

    The source text is “In Search of Lost Modernity” by Akio KAWATO.

    The English edition of this book (originally written in Japanese) is on

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hiRK7kjbX0Hxd2NOxPqtQlVWgjDHgKCr/edit

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MB0Me9P5Lpa2HGceuJUdMqqQ2CRHQSxa/edit)

    (The copyright belongs to the author, Akio Kawato)

    .

    The British State Was Formed by the Gentry, While the French State Was Built from Above:

    The modern state did not emerge only in Britain. Let’s compare Britain’s path with that of France. The contrast is striking: in Britain, royal authority declined over the 17th century, and a modern state—led by Parliament and government—gradually took shape. This system was largely driven by the gentry, the landowning class. The resulting model, with relatively light top-down regulation, helped stimulate economic activity.

    .

    Even today, Parliament and elected politicians wield significant power in the UK. In France, by contrast, it was the bureaucracy that inherited the absolute power of the king, but in Britain Parliament remained dominant, and the gentry—who largely composed it—continued to guide the country forward. This dynamic is discussed by John Brewer in his book “The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783”.

    He argues that the landowning gentry often obstructed the growth of bureaucratic authority. In this way, democracy in Britain evolved—not through a centralized civil service, but as a check on it. Bureaucrats never replaced the landowning elite as the ruling class.

    The gentry maintained their influence until the late 19th century, and the middle class that rose during the Industrial Revolution adopted their values and behavior. This included a distinct accent and vocabulary that set them apart from the lower classes, contributing to a deeply entrenched class system.

    .

    By contrast, in France, the monarchy was far stronger, and the state seemed to grow primarily to serve the king. By the late 15th century, French lords were reeling from labor shortages and rising wages caused by the Black Death, and many sought to maintain their livelihoods by entering royal service. France had few independent economic actors equivalent to England’s gentry. The small number of entrepreneurs that did emerge tended to seek royal favors and monopolistic privileges.

    One famous example is Jacques Cœur, who rose from modest origins in the early 15th century, during the Hundred Years’ War. He won the right to mint coins through a public tender and used the profits to invest in Florence’s silk, dye, and paper industries. He also secured a monopoly on salt production in the Loire Valley and became the royal family’s personal banker. But in 1452, he was arrested and forced to flee.

    .

    This pattern of centralized state power continued after the French Revolution of 1789 and reached its peak under Napoleon, who established key features of the modern state such as a legal code and universal conscription. Britain, in contrast, relied on legal precedents rather than codified laws and did not implement conscription until World War I.

    .

    In France, the monarchy, nobility, and Church absorbed large portions of the nation’s wealth, increasing the burden on ordinary citizens. While Britain’s nominal tax rate may have appeared high, it was uniform and transparent, unlike in France, where nobles and clergy collected separate, unofficial “taxes.” Some even argue that the tax burden in Britain did not actually account for a significant portion of the economy.

    .

    Britain also had a system in place to fund wars through the issuance of government bonds. Its alliance with the Netherlands, which had advanced financial tools like public debt markets, contributed to Britain’s economic edge over France and even shaped how the two states evolved.

    .

    A Nation-State Born Under Napoleon’s Dictatorship:

    Although Napoleon promoted ideals like liberty, equality, and fraternity, in practice, he fulfilled Louis XIV’s dream of a pan-European empire. In parallel he built the prototype of a modern French nation-state dominated by the central government.

    While Louis XIV had a powerful army and bureaucracy, his rule was filtered through intermediary structures—feudal lords, the Church, and guilds. The Revolution eliminated these intermediaries.

    The Revolution aimed to create a republic where people governed themselves without exploitative middlemen. But in the political vacuum that followed, Napoleon seized power—backed by conservative factions—and restructured the state so that the emperor had, so to speak, a direct relationship with the people.

    .

    Napoleon reduced Parliament to a mere rubber stamp with the Senate and Legislative Assembly becoming obedient tools. As one historian put it, most talented individuals abandoned any ambition except winning the emperor’s favor. Clergy were mobilized to support conscription, court rituals emphasized hierarchy, and an imperial family was installed with special privileges. Napoleon even revived a nobility in name, while appointing governors and mayors directly.

    .

    Meanwhile, the government bureaucracy expanded rapidly. Ministries such as the Interior, Finance, War, and Religion employed about 25,000 civil servants. Each ministry had formalized job titles, ranks, and departments. Even junior officials earned two to three times the wage of laborers (for department directors twelve times), with job security and immunity from prosecution.

    In this respect, Napoleonic France resembled a bureaucratic command state—more like Song Dynasty China or even contemporary China—than a liberal democratic nation.

  • U.S.-China Rapprochement Is Good for Japan

    Akio KAWATO

    Former Japanese diplomat

    .

    Chinese President Xi Jinping made a state visit to the United States on September 23–25. In Japan, there was considerable commotion over President Trump greeting him at the airport and emphasizing in his welcoming remarks that the United States and China had been allies during World War II. Some people even rushed to conclude that Washington had decided to form an alliance with China over Japan’s head.

    .

    This Is Not a U.S.-China Alliance

    This is an overreaction. Around the world, it is customary for leaders to extend the highest level of hospitality to a state guest. Both leaders said that their countries had been allies against Japanese militarism during World War II. This, too, was an attempt to find a historical reference that could help project friendship. There were few other obvious examples to draw on. In fact, as explained below, the United States was opposed to the Chinese Communist Party.

    .

    There was also an electoral calculation. With the midterm elections approaching, Trump wanted the visit to produce something positive he could present to voters, and therefore made a show of accommodating China. One example was the agreement under which the United States would refrain from raising tariffs on Chinese goods, while China would lower some tariffs on imports from the United States. This means that, for now, the prices of consumer goods coming from China will not rise because of additional tariffs. It is a substantial benefit for American consumers, retailers and distributors, and farmers.

    .

    Both leaders presumably understood that talk of a past “alliance” did not accurately reflect the history of their respective governments. The United States was indeed allied with China during World War II, but its ally was the Nationalist government. That government was fighting not only the Japanese military but also the Communists at home.

    After the war, the United States continued providing extensive economic and military assistance to the Nationalist government to contain the spread of communism. When that government retreated to Taiwan, Washington continued to recognize it and did not establish diplomatic relations with the newly founded People’s Republic of China.

    Later, the Nixon administration, which sought China’s help in bringing the Vietnam War to an end, began a rapprochement in 1971. Nixon visited China in 1972, and formal diplomatic relations were established in 1979. Thus, portraying the wartime alliance as an alliance between Washington and today’s government in Beijing would hardly accord with either country’s history textbooks.

    .

    What U.S.-China Rapprochement Means for Japan

    Nevertheless, the summit clearly illustrates a recent shift in U.S.-China relations. Japan must understand the nature of that shift and decide how to respond.

    I believe that a rapprochement between the United States and China is also good for Japan. Relations between Japan and China have become excessively strained. If Washington and Beijing improve their relations, both Japan and China will have less reason to maintain an unnecessarily confrontational relationship.

    .

    The United States and China also appear to have reached a tacit understanding that maintaining the status quo is the best course on Taiwan. Both presumably want to avoid developments that could lead to a direct military confrontation. China has not given up on Taiwan, but using military force or a blockade to bring about regime change there would carry major risks. The United States, for its part, would not want to expose its shortcomings to the world in defending Taiwan, as it did when it failed to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

    .

    If so, Japan’s current policy goal of raising defense spending to 4 percent of GDP becomes less urgent. For the time being, Japan should rely upon the strength of U.S. forces operating from bases in Japan as a deterrent against China and other potential threats, while gradually reducing its excessive dependence on the United States.

    .

    There is no reason to panic over the supposed emergence of a “U.S.-China alliance.” Japan needs American military power. Access to the world’s largest consumer market—the United States—is equally important. Nor does the United States intend to abandon Japan. The benefits it receives from Japan are greater than those it receives from China.

    .

    U.S. bases in Japan are essential to maintaining an American presence in the western Pacific. Close cooperation with Japan also substantially strengthens Washington’s position in its diplomacy with India and the ASEAN countries. Japanese direct investment supports one million jobs in the United States. Purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds with Japanese public and private funds are an essential factor in restraining increases in U.S. long-term interest rates (Japanese investors buy these securities because interest rates are higher than in Japan, not because Washington forces them to do so).

    .

    Throughout world history, alliances have changed. In 627 BC, during China’s Spring and Autumn period, Qin, still a relatively small state, sought to expand eastward. It abandoned its previous partner, Jin, with which it had maintained a relationship close to an alliance, and joined forces with Chu, their former common enemy.

    .

    In nineteenth-century Europe, Germany’s rise intensified the shifting of alignments among the major powers. In 1881, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia formed the League of the Three Emperors, helping to prevent Russia from aligning with France. When Germany refused to renew its treaty with Russia in 1890, Russia moved closer to France. By 1894, the two had formed the Franco-Russian Alliance, creating an opposing alignment to Germany and Austria-Hungary—a division that contributed to World War I.

    .

    U.S.-China relations have not reached anything like that stage. Even so, as the United States becomes increasingly inward-looking, Japan must strengthen its own defense capabilities—although 4 percent of GDP is probably unnecessary—and broaden its diplomatic options. Changes in the international political and economic order create opportunities. But a wrong decision can also be fatal.

    .

    Japan will not return to the fatal mistake it made before World War II: militarism and domination by the armed forces. It should uphold its existing democratic legal framework, encourage thorough discussion across government and society, and calmly carry out the changes it needs.

  • SI for President

    President Trump says AI (SI) is both excellent and safe. Great. Well then, why doesn’t the president become an AI from now on? If it’s both excellent and safe, there couldn’t be anything better for the United States—and the world.

  • What Can the Japanese Say That Matters?

    This blog is, in essence, a one-man public relations effort. I want to change the way people in Japan and around the world see things, even if I have to do it single-handedly.

    .

    I have no particular ideology and no god I believe in. My guiding principles have been simple: remain free of dogma, avoid thinking in set patterns, and defend both my own rights and those of others.

    .

    Lately, though, I have been troubled by a sense of helplessness. Japan has faded into the background on the world stage. It is as though the country barely exists. Japanese opinions are treated as irrelevant.

    Meanwhile, at home, the country seems trapped in its own inward-looking logic, turning further and further in on itself. There are no solutions to be found there—only endless sorting of people into those we like and those we don’t.

    .

    Well, every so often this weariness gets the better of me. I grumble for a while, then pull myself together.

    So, back to work.

  • A World History Free from Both Eurocentrism and Orientalism 9

    (This is a continuation of Part 8 “What Was the Modern Nation-State?“.

    Here, we will examine the process by which the modern nation-state—with its defining characteristics such as national borders, a single ethnic group, and a single language (though these are, to a large extent, artificial constructs)—took shape in Britain from the 17th century onward. At the same time, we will consider the scholarly theory that prototypes of the modern nation-state may have emerged earlier than in Britain, in places such as South America.

    .

    The source text is “In Search of Lost Modernity” by Akio KAWATO.

    The English edition of this book (originally written in Japanese) is on

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hiRK7kjbX0Hxd2NOxPqtQlVWgjDHgKCr/edit

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MB0Me9P5Lpa2HGceuJUdMqqQ2CRHQSxa/edit)

    .

    (The copyright belongs to the author, Akio Kawato)

    .

    The Design of Modern Nation

    From the 18th century onward, Britain not only led the world in the Industrial Revolution—it also laid the foundation for the modern nation-state as we know it today: a political entity where a national parliament governs directly, collecting taxes and conscripting soldiers without relying on feudal lords.

    .

    In 19th-century Britain, voting rights expanded, and democratic participation grew. As political parties competed for votes, they increasingly promoted social security programs, gradually transforming the state from an “18th-century war machine” into a welfare state.

    .

    Let’s take a closer look at the modern state that Britain built in parallel with the Industrial Revolution—the process of its development and what it ultimately meant.

    .

    Borders with Fences:

    One of the most modern phenomena is the idea of drawing lines on the ground to mark national borders—lines that cannot be crossed freely. For Japanese people, who live on an island with no land borders, this concept can feel abstract. I remember being shocked when I once saw the barbed wire separating East and West Germany stretching to the horizon and thought, “Why would anyone build something like that?”

    .

    Certainly, there are examples from ancient times, such as the Great Wall of China during the Qin dynasty and the Roman Empire’s Limes. However, these are different from modern-day borders.

    .

    The Islam region followed Europe in establishing borders in a modern sense. The Ottoman Empire and Persia (Iran) signed the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, which set vague borders. But in the Second Treaty of Erzurum (1847), with British and Russian mediation, they drafted a precise border demarcation. This marked a shift in Islamic societies from older, fluid notions of territorial boundaries to the modern Western concept of a border as a fixed line.

    The Myth of “One Language, One Race”:

    So, fixed borders became the first essential tool of a sovereign nation. The next is the concept of a common language and race. Many countries include an official language in their constitutions.

    Some nations recognize multiple official languages—not because everyone must speak all of them, but so citizens can access public services in any of the recognized languages. For instance, Belgium has two official languages, while Switzerland has four. In Central Asia, Russian still functions as a de facto official language more than 30 years after the fall of the Soviet Union. It takes time for local languages to fully take over in areas like higher education. Even in Meiji-era Japan, it took about 15 years before Japanese professors could teach core subjects at Tokyo Imperial University.

    .

    In Western Europe, languages like German and French are often thought to have developed organically, though the process is not well understood. What is clear is that the invention of the printing press (attributed to Gutenberg in the mid-15th century), the rise of mass publishing, and Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible into German (instead of Latin, which most people couldn’t read) all played major roles in shaping modern European languages.

    .

    Between 1500 and 1600, an estimated 150 to 200 million books were printed in Western Europe. Newspapers began appearing in the early 17th century. This revolution in publishing fueled the emergence of the modern nation-state. As mentioned in an earlier volume, Venice was initially the epicenter of this print culture.

    .

    There is a common belief that sovereign nations are made up of a single ethnic group. But unlike language, ethnicity is hard to define. After all, every human being is mixed if you go back far enough in your family tree.

    .

    In China, for example, the Han are the majority, but ethnic classification there is self-reported, not based on genetics. It’s not unusual for one sibling to identify as Han and another as Manchu, especially since some minority groups receive special treatment in university admissions and public services. While you might be able to imagine what a “Russian” is, there’s no such thing as an “American race.” Anyone born in the U.S.—or even those who live there long enough and pass a citizenship exam—can become American.

    .

    In today’s world, the idea that a nation must consist of a single ethnic group is not only outdated—it’s often considered taboo. Most modern constitutions, including those of Japan, the U.S., the UK, Germany, and France, make no reference to a dominant ethnic group.

    .

    Were the First Modern Nation-States in Latin America or Turkey?:

    Some scholars argue that modern nation-states emerged first in Latin America, not Europe. According to political scientist Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities, elites in Latin American colonies were inspired by the liberal reforms of King Carlos III of Spain (reigned until 1788) and moved toward independence at the end of the 18th century. When Napoleon invaded Spain, they seized the opportunity to break away. These new countries declared independence and adopted republican political systems.

    .

    However, this may be overstated. By the time Latin American nations declared independence, Britain had already developed a modern state. And in many Latin American countries, indigenous populations had no rights. The colonists’ goal was not to build inclusive modern states, but to protect their own power and wealth by establishing new borders and state structures separate from the colonial motherland. Bureaucratic institutions remained weak in many cases. Thus, it’s hard to argue that these nations were true pioneers of modern nation-states.

    .

    Interestingly, the origins of the United States were not so different. The American Revolution was primarily aimed at protecting the interests of local white elites. Though the U.S. did adopt a forward-thinking constitution rooted in Western Enlightenment ideals, the original thirteen states remained highly autonomous. When building Washington, D.C., they only offered a swamp (a literal one at that time)—a region nobody claimed. Each state retained the right to issue its own currency and resisted the creation of a central bank.

    .

    Japanese historian Masami Arai, in his book “Osman vs. Europe”, argues that Western European countries in the 17th century borrowed features of the Ottoman Empire, such as a standing army, to increase state power. These features helped them develop modern nation-states.

    But Turkey, unlike its Western peers, lacked parliamentary democracy. Meanwhile, China’s Qin Dynasty had already established a highly centralized legal and bureaucratic system in the 3rd century BC.

    In this sense, Western Europe’s true historical innovation wasn’t just centralization—it was the fusion of centralized governance with democratic ideals, inherited from ancient Greece.

  • A World History Free from Both Eurocentrism and Orientalism 8

    What Was the Modern Nation-State?

    (The modern world has been built around the “nation-state.” It has borders, a dominant national group and its language, and sovereignty over its territory. We were taught in school that the seventeenth-century Peace of Westphalia established these principles and that sovereign states stand as equals.

    Today, however, this idea of the modern state is being challenged from several directions. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and tried to replace its government—an attempt that failed. Donald Trump, who returned to the U.S. presidency in 2025, has openly embraced the imperial thinking of the nineteenth century. He used military force to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and remove him from power.

    Has the modern state become an anachronism? Or are Russia and Trump the anachronisms?

    To judge, we need to look back at history. So far, we have traced my book The Lost Modern Age as far back as ancient Greece.

    Now let us leap forward to seventeenth-century Western Europe and ask how the modern state took shape there.

    .

    The source text is “In Search of Lost Modernity” by Akio KAWATO.

    The English edition of this book (originally written in Japanese) is on

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hiRK7kjbX0Hxd2NOxPqtQlVWgjDHgKCr/edit

    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MB0Me9P5Lpa2HGceuJUdMqqQ2CRHQSxa/edit)

    .

    (The copyright belongs to the author, Akio Kawato)

    .

    The establishment of the “sovereign state”

    In the early 17th century, the Thirty Years’ War marked the decline of transnational players such as the Roman Catholic Church and Venice, as well as the Spanish Empire led by the Habsburg dynasty, and the rise of modern nation-states such as France, England, and the Netherlands as the main players in European international politics. Although representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and Venice were present during the negotiations of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), they did not sign the treaty as signatory states.

    Queen Christina of Sweden, who played a major role in ending the Thirty Years’ War, did not seek much territory and instead placed “sovereign states” at the center of the Westphalian system, marking a turning point. Sweden, which had close economic ties with the Netherlands, embodied the Dutch intention to weaken the Holy Roman Empire (this intention was shared by France, though it antagonized the Netherlands). The most important treaty within the Westphalian system, the Treaty of Münster, formalized the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire: the treaty was formally signed by representatives of German city-states such as Mainz and Bavaria.

    .

    As a result, more than 300 “sovereign states” emerged within the territory of the Holy Roman Empire. Among these, about 50 powerful states sent envoys to foreign countries and engaged in “diplomacy.” These included Saxony, Bavaria, Brandenburg-Prussia, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Frankfurt. The writer and poet Goethe was involved in the politics and administration of the Weimar Republic.

    .

    Sovereign states already existed before the Thirty Years’ War. Examples include England, France, and Sweden. Initially, their scale was small, not much different from city-states like Venice. In the 16th century, national budgets were as follows: Castile at nine million ducats, France at five million, Venice at 3.9 million, and the Ottoman Empire at six million.

    .

    France, which emerged victorious from the Thirty Years’ War, and England, which remained neutral during the war, went beyond the framework of sovereign states and strove to create empires by subjugating other countries by force. They made great efforts, and the First World War became a battle between these colonial empires.

    .

    And in the 2020s, multi-ethnic nations such as the United States, China, India, Brazil, and Russia, which stand out in terms of population and territory, behave as single “nation-states” or sovereign states, overshadowing long-established nation-states such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan.

    (to be continued)

  • Is a So-Called “National Strategy” Necessary for Humanity?

    Yesterday, while listening to a discussion at a seminar, a thought occurred to me. People often complain that “Japan has no national strategy.” But the nation-state itself is something of a mirage.

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    Once a society begins producing a surplus—in other words, once it accumulates wealth—people emerge who take it upon themselves to use that wealth. They have no practical job of their own and are, in a sense, a “superfluous class.” They usurp society’s wealth in an attempt to realize their own ambitions and preconceived notions. Is that what we call a national strategy?

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    What individuals want is quite simple: a decent life, security, and freedom. It is enough for the state to guarantee their security. People can earn their livelihoods through their own skills or by working for a company.

    The elites who control society’s wealth should simply keep quiet and refrain from meddling.

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    The neoconservatives who once held sway in the United States and today’s Russian imperialists are all people who stir up unnecessary trouble around the world・・・・・・