The war in Ukraine has now entered its fifth year. Not only Ukraine but Russia itself—despite being a great power—has been badly worn down.
The recent surge in oil prices caused by the war with Iran has given Moscow some temporary breathing room. Yet the underlying strains remain severe. Thousands of tanks and armored vehicles have been destroyed in Ukraine, while even the production of artillery pieces and shells can no longer keep pace with the rate of battlefield consumption. Manpower is another growing problem: every time the Kremlin contemplates a new wave of mobilization, young men begin fleeing abroad.
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On top of that the world is not paying enough attention to a major political test in September: elections for the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, together with unified regional and local elections across the country.
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From my own years serving in Russia, I can say with confidence that “successfully conducting an election”—meaning preserving the outward appearance of democracy while ensuring victory for the ruling party—becomes the government’s highest priority more than a year in advance.
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In the West, Russian elections are usually regarded as little more than stage-managed theater. Most of the time, that is true. But every now and then, the theater catches fire.
During the parliamentary elections of 2011, protests erupted from December of that year through May of the next, nominally over alleged manipulation of vote counting but in reality directed against Putin’s return to the presidency. On December 10, 2011, more than 50,000 people gathered in a square within sight of the Kremlin, shouting slogans against the authorities. That must have been a genuinely chilling moment for Putin.
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The opposition leaders and anti-government activists who used social media at the time to mobilize demonstrators have since been almost completely eliminated—through imprisonment, exile, political disqualification, or worse. Social media platforms themselves have also been carefully arranged so that information can flow directly to the authorities.
Even so, the presidential administration almost certainly assumes that agencies such as the CIA or MI6 will try to stir unrest again, and it is no doubt already preparing countermeasures.
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The most fundamental way to stabilize the political situation would be to bring the war in Ukraine to some kind of conclusion.
The coming spring offensive, once the mud season ends, will be decisive. If Russia can seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, it could declare victory and then seek a ceasefire—perhaps offering partial withdrawal from southern Ukraine as the price. That would be the best-case scenario for the Kremlin.
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A Decisive Way to Change the Political Mood: Putin’s Resignation (and Rule From Behind the Curtain)
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If the spring offensive fails, however, the Kremlin cannot simply go into the parliamentary elections;
it would be forced to “drastically change the political scenery.” Without such a shift, the elections could become deeply troublesome.
Younger voters of military age see no opposition party worth supporting, so their likely response would be mass abstention. The ruling party, United Russia, would still secure an overwhelming majority—perhaps even surpassing its current 72 percent of the seats—thanks to the support of older and more conservative voters.
That may be convenient for the authorities domestically, but internationally it would only deepen Russia’s reputation as an increasingly naked autocracy.
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The most effective way to change the mood would be a shift at the top: replacing the president.
Putin could resign and devote himself to the chairmanship of the State Council. Until now, this body has largely been decorative, but institutionally (by virtue of the Constitution) it possesses the authority to coordinate key ministries on major matters of state.
At present, Putin’s close aide Alexei Dyumin appears to be preparing the ground in his role as secretary of the Council. As the de facto deputy to a “Chairman Putin” ruling from behind the scenes, Dyumin would steadily accumulate political weight as a future presidential candidate.
Under the constitution, a presidential election must be held within three months of Putin’s resignation. In the interim, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin could serve perfectly well as acting president, exactly as the constitution prescribes.
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Many in the West still assume that if Putin leaves, Russia will naturally become a freer country. That is naive. The masses seek bread, not abstract freedom. The small educated class that does desire political liberalization is kept firmly under control by the old KGB-descended security apparatus, which continues to watch every corner of society.
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Freedom would bring a chaos
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If, as happened during the Soviet collapse, the security organs were suddenly to lose their grip and “liberalization” were to emerge, Russia would likely descend into chaos. In the Russian historical experience, “freedom” too often means the absence of rules altogether—a world where money and violence prevail unchecked.
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Since Putin first came to power in 2000, Russia has undeniably become far more modern in appearance. Yet that transformation was built on soaring oil prices and on access to Western capital and technology (before the sanctions due to the War on Ukraine).
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Russia still lacks the capacity to sustain long-term development by its own internal strength.
Its elites continue to posture as if they lead a great power, but Russia is unlikely to become a true shaper of world affairs.
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In the end, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to conclude until one side is exhausted to the point of collapse. There remains a real possibility that Russia, like the Korean Peninsula, will simply freeze the conflict without resolving its underlying causes. In that case, it may evolve into something like a “larger North Korea”—a militarized state carrying a permanent source of instability within itself.