日本では自分だけの殻にこもっているのが、一番心地いい。これが個人主義だと、我々は思っています。でも、日本には皆で議論するべきことがまだ沢山あります。そして日本、アジアの将来を、世界中の人々と話し合っていかなければなりません。このブログは、日本語、英語、中国語、ロシア語でディベートができる、世界で唯一のサイトです。世界中のオピニオン・メーカー達との議論をお楽しみください。


How Japan Realized Economic Development 1: The Myth of the “Japanese Model”

(Until the rise of South Korea and, later, China, Japan’s economic development was a major focus of attention for developing countries and former socialist nations seeking economic reform. This was because Japan was the only non-white country to have achieved industrialization.
Although Japan’s economy is not currently attracting much global attention, there will likely come a time when interest returns. In preparation for that time, I would like to discuss the realities of Japan’s economy in a series of articles. In this installment, I will argue that the term “Japanese Model” is a mirage.)

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The Myth of the “Japanese Model”

                     Akio KAWATO

Stereotypical views on the nature of Japan’s economy are many. A common belief is that Japan somehow leaped overnight from a backward feudal society into an economic superpower after World War II. Others explain the so-called “Japanese economic miracle” by claiming that Japanese workers blindly obeyed their companies and the government. Still others imagine that the Japanese state controlled the economy almost as tightly as the Soviet Union.

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Japan was the first non-Western nation to achieve large-scale industrial success. Before the World War II, it competed with the European colonial powers, and after the war its exports flooded world markets, dealing painful blows to many Western industries. Not surprisingly, Japan became both admired and distrusted.

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Many people in the West have argued that Japan’s success was due to unfair competition resulting from low wages or the country’s underdeveloped society, which led companies to be subservient to the government and workers to be obedient to their employers.

From such point of view, Japan’s present economic stagnation is simply the inevitable result. A backward society, they argue, eventually failed to adapt to globalization.

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Reality, however, is far more complicated.

Japan did not suddenly emerge from centuries of darkness. One could even argue that Japan was destined to become a developed nation. In the Middle Ages, Japan was already part of the East Asian trading system centered on China. It was said to be one of the world’s largest exporter of gold and the world’s largest importer of sugar.

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Historians still debate why Japan adopted its policy of national isolation in the seventeenth century. Whatever the reasons, the result was that Japan learned to produce almost everything domestically. Internal commerce expanded rapidly. Although the country remained feudal in form, it had already developed something resembling a unified national market.

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Urban culture flourished in Edo and Osaka. When major events occurred, special news sheets were printed and sold on the streets. Many ordinary families sent their children to terakoya schools, where they learned reading, writing, and arithmetic. These schools taught Confucian ethics, the dignity of honest work inter alia.

One influential thinker was Ishida Baigan, whose philosophy blended Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism. His teachings remind us in many ways of the Protestant work ethic in Europe. He argued that a person’s place in society is justified only through honesty and diligent work. That belief remains deeply rooted in Japanese society even today.

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Japanese craftsmanship was probably among the finest in the world. Gardening also reached remarkable levels. Contemporary accounts describe Edo as a city almost buried in greenery—something like an ecological city centuries before the term existed.

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If a samurai killed a commoner without good reason, public opinion often condemned the act. This surprisingly egalitarian spirit can be seen in the comic stories of rakugo and in the writings of Ihara Saikaku.

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What people now call the “Japanese model” was not created overnight. It gradually evolved after the Meiji Restoration. Nor was it designed by a single visionary leader, as some people in the West or Russia seem to imagine.

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In less than seventy years before World War II, Japan had built a modern heavy industrial base, became an urban society, and created a large middle class. Anyone who watches Japanese films from the 1930s can see this quite clearly. Many foreigners assume that modern Japan only appeared after the war, as if it had magically transformed itself from feudalism into capitalism. In reality, Japan had already become a modern society before 1945.

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Perhaps that is why the war itself felt, for many ordinary Japanese, like a natural disaster. It suddenly burst into peaceful homes, took away fathers and sons, and sent them to die in distant places few had ever heard of.

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When the war finally ended, people felt they had become free again. They worked with extraordinary determination—not because they blindly obeyed their bosses, but because they wanted to rebuild the lives they had lost.

Japanese employees do not work hard because they worship their companies. They work because if the company succeeds, their wages rise, bonuses increase, and their families enjoy a better life. There is another reason as well. Someone who does not do his share soon loses the respect of colleagues—and eventually his own self-respect.

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Ingredients of the “Japanese model

Much has been written about the so-called “Japanese model” that supposedly collapsed under globalization. Yet no one has ever agreed on exactly what that model is.

When foreigners discuss it—often critically—they usually mean lifetime employment, seniority-based promotion, family-like relationships inside companies, decision-making by consensus after extensive informal consultation, the ringi approval system, and supposedly strict government guidance of the economy.

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Lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion became firmly established around the time of World War II. But lifetime employment has never been uniquely Japanese. Even in Japan, fewer than half of all workers ever enjoyed that level of security.

People everywhere prefer to know what their future will look like. For that reason, even in the United States, companies such as IBM and many large banks traditionally offered careers that, in practice, were very close to lifetime employment.

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Why, then, have Westerners and Russians often viewed Japan’s lifetime employment system with suspicion? Probably because they believe it has made Japanese society bureaucratic, stagnant, and excessively obedient to corporations.

It is true that Japanese tend to behave very politely toward their superiors. Foreign visitors often see only that. What they usually miss is that once a meeting begins, discussions inside Japanese companies can become surprisingly frank and lively (there are exceptions, though).

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To say that Japan’s economic miracle was created solely by the “Japanese model” is an exaggeration. After the war, the real driving forces were the explosive growth of domestic demand and a favorable international economy.

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If one element truly deserves the label “Japanese model,” it is probably Japan’s well-developed financial and credit system. Most of the other features—such as lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion—were not the causes of rapid growth but its consequences. Only prosperous companies can afford to maintain such expensive employment practices.

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Finally, regarding the Japanese government’s industrial policy: There certainly was an industrial policy. However, it was not a Soviet-style planned economy. While the government did set goals and support companies through loans from government-affiliated financial institutions and tax incentives, the fundamental mechanism was that large private banks channeled public deposits into corporate loans, and competition among private companies generated dynamism.

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This differs from modern-day China, where excessive production is achieved through massive government subsidies.

3 responses to “How Japan Realized Economic Development 1: The Myth of the “Japanese Model””

  1. Hal Hansen Avatar
    Hal Hansen

    I took up your invitation to follow your posts. It was a fun read. However, I have some real concerns. I am not a Japan expert, but have long been interested in the subject. Moreover, I am an economic historian. I queried AI with the following:

    HEH: A friend of mine penned the following account of Japanese economic development. Unfortunately, it lacks citations concerning the accounts he questions. He has nothing to say about US postwar policies. How much of a role did they play and in what way? There was also Japan’s growth during the Korean, Cold, and Vietnamese wars that profited its economy enormously. Plus, like Europe, the US defense umbrella precluded high defense expenditures, public funds that could be invested in infrastructure, education, and other public policies. At the same time, Japan footed much of the bill for American presence on its soil which moderates this advantage somewhat. What is your frank assessment of this sketch?

    ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

    AI:

    Concise takeaway
    Your friend’s sketch is substantially incomplete. Any account of Japan’s postwar economic development that omits:
    • U.S. occupation reforms
    • The “reverse course”
    • The Korean War boom
    • Cold War strategic alignment
    • Vietnam War procurement
    • The U.S. defense umbrella and Japan’s extremely low defense burden
    • Japan’s host‑nation support costs
    …cannot explain the timing, scale, or character of Japan’s post‑1955 growth.

    Japan’s domestic institutions mattered enormously — but they were activated, protected, and amplified by U.S. policy and Cold War conditions. Without these external factors, Japan’s growth would have resembled a normal OECD trajectory, not an “economic miracle.”

    1. What your friend’s sketch likely gets right
    If he emphasizes:
    • Meiji‑era state building
    • Prewar industrialization and human capital
    • Bureaucratic competence (MITI, MOF)
    • Social discipline and organizational culture
    • High savings rates and export orientation
    …these are legitimate and important. Japan did not begin from zero in 1945.
    But these factors alone cannot explain the acceleration of growth after 1955, nor the extraordinary performance of 1958–1973.

    2. What is missing — and why it is decisive

    A. U.S. occupation reforms (1945–47): the structural reset
    These reforms fundamentally reshaped Japan’s political economy:
    • Land reform: broke landlord power, raised rural incomes, created a domestic consumer base.
    • Zaibatsu dissolution (partial): reduced concentrated industrial power and encouraged competition.
    • Labor democratization: unions, collective bargaining.
    • Constitutional reforms: parliamentary democracy, Article 9 demilitarization.
    These were not cosmetic. They changed the distribution of power, capital, and incentives inside Japan.

    B. The “reverse course” (1948–52): pivot to growth
    As Cold War priorities intensified, U.S. policy shifted:
    • Reindustrialization became the priority.
    • Zaibatsu breakup was relaxed, enabling keiretsu formation.
    • Conservative political forces were supported.
    • Anti‑communist stabilization became central.
    This shift is essential to understanding Japan’s later trajectory.

    C. The Korean War boom (1950–53): Japan’s “Marshall Plan”
    This is one of the most important missing pieces.
    U.S. military procurement during the Korean War amounted to a massive export stimulus for Japanese industry. Japan became the U.S. military’s logistics and repair hub. Industrial output surged. Foreign exchange constraints evaporated.
    Many economic historians argue that the Korean War was more important to Japan’s recovery than the Marshall Plan was to Europe.

    D. Cold War geopolitics: the U.S.–Japan alliance
    The 1958–60 consolidation of the alliance produced:
    • Guaranteed access to U.S. markets
    • Technology transfer
    • Stable external environment
    • Near‑zero defense burden (Japan spent ~1% of GDP on defense; the U.S. spent 8–10%)
    • Predictable trade and investment flows
    Modern econometric studies using synthetic‑control methods show:
    • Japan’s per‑capita GDP growth from 1958–68 was ~9.3%.
    • A counterfactual “synthetic Japan” grew at ~3.6%.
    This is not a small difference. It is the difference between a “miracle” and a normal OECD trajectory.

    E. Vietnam War procurement (1965–73): second major stimulus
    Less dramatic than Korea, but still significant:
    • Electronics
    • Machinery
    • Transport equipment
    • Construction materials
    Japan again served as a logistics and supply hub.

    F. The defense‑burden asymmetry
    This is crucial and often overlooked.
    Because the U.S. guaranteed Japan’s security:
    • Japan spent 1% of GDP on defense.
    • Western Europe spent 3–5%.
    • The U.S. spent 8–10%.
    The savings were redirected into:
    • Infrastructure
    • Education
    • R&D
    • Industrial policy
    • Export promotion
    This is one of the clearest examples of how geopolitics shapes growth trajectories.

    G. Japan’s host‑nation support costs
    You correctly note that Japan paid substantial costs for the American presence:
    • Base construction
    • Utilities
    • Labor
    • Land leases
    • Local infrastructure
    These costs moderated the defense‑burden advantage but did not eliminate it. Even with host‑nation support, Japan’s effective defense burden remained far below that of other advanced economies.

    3. How much of Japan’s growth was due to U.S. policy?
    Balanced scholarly consensus
    • Japan’s domestic institutions were necessary.
    • U.S. policy and Cold War conditions were decisive in enabling and accelerating growth.
    • The Korean War boom was transformative.
    • The alliance reduced defense burdens and stabilized the environment.
    • Without these factors, Japan’s growth would have been dramatically slower.
    Quantitative evidence
    Modern synthetic‑control studies show:
    • Japan’s per‑capita GDP growth from 1958–68 was ~9.3%.
    • The counterfactual “synthetic Japan” grew at ~3.6%.
    This is the strongest empirical demonstration of the alliance’s economic impact.

    4. My frank assessment of your friend’s sketch

    A. It is incomplete
    Leaving out U.S. occupation policy, the Korean War boom, Cold War geopolitics, Vietnam War procurement, and the defense‑burden effect produces an analytically distorted picture.

    B. It risks overstating internal continuity
    Japan’s prewar foundations mattered, but the rupture of 1945–52 and the geopolitical environment of the Cold War were equally decisive.

    C. It lacks citations
    If he is questioning established accounts, he must cite the historiography. Japanese economic history is one of the most heavily studied fields in development economics.

    D. It underestimates external drivers
    Japan’s “miracle” was not purely endogenous. It was the product of domestic capability plus extraordinary external conditions.

    E. It needs revision
    The sketch is salvageable — but only if it integrates the external geopolitical and economic drivers that shaped Japan’s postwar trajectory.

  2. akiokawato Avatar
    akiokawato

    Thank you for comment. But I did not intend to offer a complete description and avoided to repeat things which are mostly known.

    1. Hal Hansen Avatar
      Hal Hansen

      Understandable. However: “After the war, the real driving forces were the explosive growth of domestic demand and a favorable international economy.” Japan underwent some pretty fundamental changes during and in the wake of the war, wouldn’t you agree? The “favorable international economy” hardly does justice to what actually happened. The international context mattered, as it did for the Americans, Germans, French, and smaller European nations, all of which enjoyed unparalleled growth throughout most of the postwar period. One might argue that what these nations shared — the international context — was as important as their idiosyncratic developmental paths. At the same time, I completely agree with your critique of “the Japanese model” literature in the tradition of James C. Abegglen, Chalmers Johnson, Ezra Vogel, Ronald Dore, Kent Calder, and Thomas Rohlen, people I read while in Japan. I must confess, however, I learned a great deal from their work.

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