(This essay was originally written in March 2025. Since then, Professor Joseph Nye has passed away. The issues discussed here, however, remain urgent. I have therefore updated and reposted it.)
On February 25, 2025, I read in Newsweek Japan an article by Joseph Nye, the architect of the concept of “soft power,” titled “Why America Holds the Advantage in a New Cold War with China.” His argument was reassuring: taken as a whole, the United States still holds the upper hand—above all because of its alliances and its soft power.
I knew Professor Nye in Boston. Our conversations were never casual. He would begin with rapid, pointed questions—an oral examination of sorts—and only after you demonstrated clarity would he truly engage. I respected that discipline. So let me engage him again.
I have long supported the U.S.–Japan alliance. Japan needs it strategically and economically. More importantly, I believe postwar Japan’s system of freedom and democracy has been a success. But today I am uneasy. President Trump appears convinced that the postwar international order disadvantages the United States—and he seems willing to dismantle it.
After World War II, alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty were built to contain authoritarian expansion. The Soviet Union consolidated Eastern Europe. In Asia, the Korean War erupted. The Cold War was not ideological theater; it was a response to real expansion by coercive regimes.
Today’s U.S.–China rivalry grows from similar structural tensions. But if America now conducts itself as a power openly seeking territorial acquisition or economic privilege—whether in Greenland, Gaza, or elsewhere—it blurs the moral distinction that once defined it. If great powers all behave the same way, then soft power disappears. Only hard power remains. And hard power alone is not enough.
America’s advantages—its vast consumer market, the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, unmatched military capacity—are formidable. But if relationships are reduced to transactions based purely on leverage, then allies become temporary partners of convenience. Europe and Japan will conclude that they must hedge, diversify, and ultimately rely more heavily on themselves.
Meanwhile, China’s soft power—once easy to dismiss—is quietly growing
For years I assumed authoritarian China would never attract young people abroad. Yet rising living standards have modernized Chinese society in visible ways. In animation, gaming, and digital culture, Chinese firms have absorbed Japanese techniques and are now competing globally—including inside Japan itself. For young Japanese, China is no longer an abstraction. It is part of their everyday world.
At the same time, America’s structural weaknesses are becoming harder to ignore. Neither subsidies under President Biden nor tariffs under President Trump will restore manufacturing competitiveness on their own. The deeper problem is short-termism. Shareholder pressure discourages long-term investment. Corporations pursue margin optimization over durable quality. Transactional logic crowds out strategic patience.
Even the U.S. military—the core pillar of American power—faces drift. The traditional banner of “defending freedom and democracy alongside our allies” has been lowered. Recruitment is declining. Innovation is increasingly concentrated in a handful of large defense contractors. Shipbuilding capacity has eroded to the point that American firms seek partnership capital from South Korean shipyards.
In past decades, so-called neoconservatives attempted to spread democracy through regime change. The results were often instability and suspicion toward the United States. Ending that approach was wise. But replacing it with improvised acts—purchasing territories, forcibly removing foreign leaders without a clear strategic framework—does not restore coherence. It projects unpredictability. And unpredictability erodes trust. If America abandons its moral vocabulary while retaining only its material power, it will still be strong—but it will no longer be followed.
For Japan, the path is clear. We must strengthen our own defense capabilities. We must avoid unnecessary confrontation with China while firmly preserving our domestic system of freedom and democracy. And we should work to build international mechanisms that restrain armed aggression by any state that violates the rights of others.
Dear Joe, your concept of soft power still matters. But soft power cannot survive without moral consistency. If America wishes to lead in this new era, it must decide whether it is merely a great power—or still a principled one. The future of modern civilization may depend on that choice.