Watching the current war with Iran, one striking feature is that U.S. Navy warships, particularly aircraft carriers, are staying away from the Strait of Hormuz—or perhaps are simply unable to get close to it. Presumably, the danger posed by mines, as well as Iranian missiles and drones, is simply too great.
.
If we transpose this situation to the Far East, the implications are significant. In a Taiwan contingency, not only would it become increasingly difficult for U.S. aircraft carriers to enter the immediate theater of operations, but the way the Marine Corps—expected to play an important role in the region—fights and deploys would also have to change.
.
So I asked ChatGPT to look into the matter. It turns out that the Marine Corps began changing its doctrine and force structure several years ago. The basic idea seems to be this: instead of trying to send a massive force into the theater after war has broken out, position small units at key locations beforehand.
What follows is an exchange between Kawato and ChatGPT.
.
Kawato:
I have a question about the U.S. Marine Corps. With the proliferation of cheap unmanned weapons, it has become increasingly difficult for Marines to conduct amphibious landings on enemy-held territory. Large and slow amphibious assault ships themselves would make inviting targets for the enemy and might no longer be usable in the traditional way.
I remember seeing an article in a Japanese magazine about the restructuring of the Marine Corps, but I can no longer find it. Are there U.S. or Japanese publications discussing this? What do they say? And are there articles or papers examining how this restructuring might affect the Marine Corps presence in Japan?
.
ChatGPT:
Yes, there are. And the direction of the change is quite clear.
The article you remember was probably discussing the sequence of reforms known as Force Design 2030—now generally referred to simply as Force Design—together with the creation of the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) and the concept of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).
Your basic question—“Has large-scale amphibious assault against a defended enemy become increasingly impractical?”—is very close to the starting point of these reforms.
The Marine Corps, however, has not gone so far as to say, “Therefore, we no longer need amphibious ships.”
Instead, it is trying to reorganize its forces around a combination of large amphibious ships, smaller and more dispersed vessels, unmanned systems, and small Marine units operating from islands and other forward positions.
.
Under Force Design, the Marine Corps is shifting away from traditional large ground-combat formations toward forces that are lighter, more dispersed, and have a lower signature—meaning they are harder for the enemy to detect—and that can operate even inside the enemy’s missile-engagement zone.
As for large amphibious ships, the Marine Corps has not proposed abolishing them. On the contrary, its 2023 Force Design update explicitly envisioned amphibious ships serving in the future as “motherships” for manned and unmanned systems.
In this concept, amphibious ships would remain offshore and deploy smaller craft, aircraft, and unmanned systems. Small Marine units positioned in advance on islands and other strategic locations would conduct reconnaissance, anti-ship operations, and air defense.
.
The Marine Corps plans to reduce its traditional force structure by roughly 12,000 personnel by 2030 while shifting resources toward long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, and anti-ship capabilities.
.
As a result, the Marines in Okinawa have, if anything, become more important.
Japan’s Ministry of Defense explains this point in its Defense of Japan 2024 white paper. The 12th Marine Regiment at Camp Hansen in Okinawa has been redesignated as the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (12th MLR). Unlike a traditional artillery regiment, the new formation is designed to integrate anti-ship capabilities, air defense, logistics, and ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
.
The concept behind the new Marine Corps is no longer simply to station tens of thousands of Marines on Okinawa and then launch a massive amphibious assault from there. To simplify the geography, the battlefield it is preparing for runs along the line: Okinawa–Miyako–Ishigaki–Yonaguni–Taiwan–the Philippines.
.
Put simply, part of the Marine Corps is evolving from a force that attacks from the sea onto the land into something resembling a land-based naval force that hides on islands and denies the enemy use of the surrounding seas.
The Marines are trying to transform themselves from a force that lands on enemy territory after war begins into one that is already operating inside the enemy’s weapons-engagement zone before hostilities begin. These are the Stand-In Forces.
.
Under this concept, there is no need to wait until a Taiwan conflict erupts and then send amphibious ships charging into the combat zone. Marines would already be deployed in peacetime in places such as Okinawa and Japan’s southwestern islands, allowing them to move rapidly into combat posture if war breaks out.
.
There are, however, major weaknesses in this concept.
Some retired Marines and other critics argue that the Marine Corps does not have sufficient maritime transportation to move small units rapidly from island to island, and that its existing vessels are inadequate to implement the concept. Others point to the enormous difficulty of supplying dispersed units once combat begins.
.
And as drone and AI-enabled surveillance improves rapidly, the basic assumption underlying EABO—that small, dispersed units will remain difficult to find—may itself become questionable.
This will probably be one of the biggest challenges facing Force Design in the years ahead.
.
This concept has already moved well beyond the stage of being merely a plan for the future. In June of this year, the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment in Okinawa actually received NMESIS anti-ship missile systems and MADIS counter-drone and air-defense systems.
In other words, the Marine Corps in Okinawa has already begun its real-world transformation from a traditional amphibious landing force into a force designed to deny an adversary access to key straits and maritime areas.
Leave a Reply