Akio KAWATO (Japan’s DCM in Moscow 1998~2002)
Lately, Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to have lost momentum. His approval ratings have been slowly slipping. Even a look at the Kremlin’s official website shows fewer presidential events, both domestic and diplomatic. During the International Women’s Day ceremony in early March, television cameras caught him coughing rather unnaturally, which sparked quiet speculation about his health.
Meanwhile, Russia’s parliamentary general election is approaching in September. It attracts little attention in the West, but for Russia’s leadership, “preserving the appearance of democracy while ensuring a ruling-party victory” is, especially in wartime, an extremely difficult task; Russia is not a totalitarian society as we deem. Let us look at how the situation may unfold.
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Stalemate on the Ukrainian Front
One major reason for the current lack of momentum lies on the Ukrainian front.
Russia has lost more than 3,000 tanks, and the front has been locked in trench warfare for over two years. Ukraine, making extensive use of drones, has been able to repel Russian infantry advances.
In response, Russia mass-produced copies of Iran’s Shahed drones and launched dramatic attacks this winter, mainly targeting Ukraine’s power infrastructure. But electricity service has already been largely restored, and Ukraine, through nimble innovation, has developed drones specifically designed to intercept Russian drones. Reports say the interception rate exceeds 90 percent.
Russia’s military-industrial complex, however, is built around the mass production of fixed designs. It takes time for such a system to develop and deploy new weapons capable of countering these Ukrainian innovations.
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On top of this comes the question of Russia’s expected “summer offensive,” which should begin once the spring mud season ends. If that offensive fails to produce meaningful results, the sense of strategic deadlock in the Ukraine war will sharply intensify.
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Another factor weakening Russia’s morale is that President Donald Trump—busy with the Iran war—has lately stopped paying much attention to Russia over Ukraine. For Moscow, part of its global prestige comes simply from being treated as a meaningful negotiating partner by the United States.
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Losing Ground on All Sides
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Meanwhile, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia have burned through large numbers of expensive U.S.-made Patriot air-defense missiles while defending themselves from Iranian attacks. As a result, they have urgently invited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and begun seeking Ukrainian-made air-defense drones, along with trained operators. The logic is simple: if Ukrainian drones are effective against Russian drones copied from Iran’s Shahed models, they should be effective against the original Iranian Shaheds as well. Saudi Arabia and others have already signed security agreements with Ukraine and will likely provide substantial financial support going forward.
In addition, on the 12th, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary lost its election, allowing the EU to move forward with the previously promised €90 billion loan package for Ukraine.
Last autumn, the leaders of Central Asian states lined up at the White House to signal loyalty to Washington. In Moldova, its Russian-populated region of Transnistria is facing growing pressure for reintegration, while Moscow is increasingly unable to offer meaningful support.
Russia on its part signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Iran in January 2025, yet it has been unable to provide visible assistance in Iran’s war with the United States and Israel.
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Only a few years ago, Russia boasted of close relations with Turkey, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and others, earning a reputation as a “shadow great power” in the Middle East. Today, politically, economically, and militarily, it has very few cards left to play.
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An Economy That Oil Prices Cannot Rescue
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Russia’s economy had already begun to show signs of stagnation earlier this year, as high interest rates—used to fight inflation—started exhausting businesses. Falling global oil prices through the end of last year made things worse. By early March, there was even discussion inside the government of cutting all non-essential budget items by 10 percent across the board (except, of course, defense) (March 9, Reuters).
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Normally, Russia is often rescued by rising oil prices. This time, that almost happened again: the Iran war pushed oil prices sharply upward. And yet, government and military morale remain strangely subdued.
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It appears that Russia’s major oil export ports—Ust-Luga and Primorsk on the Baltic Sea, and Novorossiysk on the Black Sea—have all suffered significant damage from long-range Ukrainian drone attacks. Details remain unclear, but this may mean Russia is unable to fully benefit from higher oil prices. In the Pacific direction, Asian countries strongly want more Russian oil, but both pipeline capacity and loading capacity at Vladivostok port remain limited.
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Social Discontent Building Toward September election
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Russia will hold parliamentary general elections in September. The usual assumption is that “Russian elections are fake—results are manipulated, and the ruling party always wins.” That is often true. But dissatisfaction in Russian society is now growing over war fatigue, inflation, and uncertainty.
There is precedent: in 2011, protests against parliamentary election fraud swelled dramatically in Moscow and other cities. Russia is not a perfectly controlled totalitarian state.
Until now, young people in major cities like Moscow were rarely drafted into the war, and citizens fully enjoyed several years of rising real wages. But wage growth is now losing momentum, while inflation is accelerating due to VAT hikes and rising utility costs.
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Internet Controls: Back to Soviet-Style Isolation: At the same time, under the excuse of “preventing Ukrainian drones from using communications networks,” Western internet services such as Telegram are being blocked one after another, while Russian-made apps are increasingly being forced on users.
Telegram alone is used daily by around 70 million people—roughly half of Russia’s 140 million population. Unlike Russian apps, it allows private communications to remain relatively secure. People are deeply unhappy about losing that freedom.
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Backdoor Mobilization: Most decisive of all is the beginning of what amounts to de facto mobilization. At the end of March, the military announced the creation of an “Unmanned Systems Force.” By 2026, it plans to recruit 79,000 personnel, eventually expanding to 210,000 troops—a strangely large number for something supposedly “unmanned.”
Drone operations require well-educated personnel, so students and engineers are now among the primary targets for recruitment (March 30, The Jamestown Foundation). Officially, recruitment is voluntary. But universities and other institutions are reportedly being given numerical recruitment targets.
Public opinion is highly suspicious: many believe this is mobilization in disguise. People fear that “drone operators” will eventually be used as ordinary frontline combat troops. As a result, anxiety is spreading rapidly.
If this continues, September’s election could see mass abstention, exposing to the world that the government no longer enjoys genuine social support.
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Putin’s Possible “Retirement Without Leaving”
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If the Kremlin wants to prevent that outcome, one possible path would be to achieve some form of ceasefire in Ukraine, have President Putin formally resign “taking responsibility,” and then allow him to rule from behind the scenes.
He could do so as chairman of the State Council—a body that existed before, but was institutionalized and strengthened by recent constitutional reforms, with authority to coordinate ministries on the most important national policies. Putin is already its chairman.
In effect, it would be a form of cloistered rule—an imperial retirement without real retirement.
The current silence from the Kremlin may be the first sign of such a sudden political shift to come.