1.Many people presuppose a monolithic and strategic thinking on the part of the Chinese government. But it may not be the case. Especially, in the territorial disputes with implication of energy resources the interest of the intelligence and security forces 公安 (they are deeply embedded in oil and gas companies) may sometimes prevail, forming a black-box in their decision-making.
As you yourself state in the conclusion, this complex aspect is intentionally omitted from the paper. It is understandable, but yet this qualification had better be reminded of in other parts, too.

2. I would not think that the Chinese diplomacy is guided by specific "norm" . On the contrary, I consider, norms and PRs are guided by their foreign policy, which is their means of realizing their national or even personal interests. When the Western economy is strong enough, China may abide by the status quo, but in times like now they would not hesitate to impose their own values and interests on others.

3. As regards the issues with Japan, the East China Sea boundary issue and the Senkaku Islands issues are different and are not intertwined at least officially. The East China EEZ boundary issue came to the fore after the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. And the negotiations are about where to draw the median line for the EEZ. What is at stake is natural gas.

The Chinese had raised their claim on the Senkaku Island in the 1970s. The islands were officially annexed to Japan in 1895, but the Chinese side did not raise any claim (both countries were at a war at that time). So, if the IJC be allowed to make judgement, the Japanese position is very tenable.
Only in 1971, after a large (allegedly) oil reserve was found, the Chinese government registered official claim. The islands are now effectively under Japanese rule, but on the basis of a treaty fishing by the Chinese is allowed on adjacent waters around the islands.
The Chinese are eager to dig oil around the islands. I think that if it is done on commercial basis, Japan can be flexible. But the Chinese approach to Japan with a judicial premise that the islands belong to them, proposing "joint exploration on an equal basis", for example. The great Mao used to state that the islands should come to China by 2010, and the Chinese government judicially (fictitiouly) "annexed" the islands, by adopting a new law on its territories.

So, the Chinese may look flexible, but this is an often-used technique by socialst countries: first make an unduely large and even irrational demand, then make small concessions one by one, and you can look flexible to the third parties.

I am a very flexible person, but the Senkaku issue is a matter of principle not only for Japan but also for other countries in Asia. We should not allow a formula: China demands something, ignoring judicial and historical background, and this becomes a legitimate international conflict.

Other comments are;
1. (about Japan P13) Around 1998 Japan substantially reduced its ODA to China. It was done against the will of the Chinese government. The Japanese government wanted to continue with it, but could not hold the domestic pressure for reduction. The argument for reduction was the economic growth of China and the nuclear bomb testing.

2. (about Japan P12) The name is mis-spelled. It is Yohei Kohno (or Youhei Kono).

3. (about Japan P15) The massive anti-Japan demonstration was caused not so much by the textbook issue (it may be one of the claims) as the growing possibility of Japan becoming a full member of the Security Council of the U.N.

4. (about Japan P23) The last paragraph, especially the last sentence, may be taken by the Japanese readers that you took the Chinese PR at face value. Please see my point 3 about 10 centimeters above this.

I wish a success in your writing and remain
Sincerely yours
Akio KAWATO