(This article has been published by Princeton University Press in December 2006 as a part of a book complied by Prof.Gilbert Rozman et.al on Japan's postwar diplomacy)
　　　　　　　　　 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　14.1,2006
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 Akio Kawato
The Eurasian continent in ancient times consisted of three major civilizations: China, the Orient (composite of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Persia), and the Roman Empire. Today Oriental civilization, which has probably the oldest origin among the three and extends from Morocco to the Ferghana Valley and even to Xinjiang, is mostly ignored, being simply identified with Islam and backwardness. Its glory as the center of science and art went into oblivion, connections among nations were ignored, and, owing to its critical geographical location, the history of the Eurasian continent as seen from East Asia was thereby deformed into a collection of separate civilizations.
The situation is even worse for Central Asia. Although it used to be one of the centers of Oriental culture, it is today considered to be a mere desert and backward former colony of the Soviet Union. In fact Central Asia possesses vast arable land between the Amu and Sir Rivers and people originating from this region often played vital roles in the politics and economies of surrounding countries, such as India and China. The Mughal dynasty in India was founded by an Uzbek prince, Babur. Afghanistan used to be an indivisible part of the advanced Oriental civilization. The role of Persians, Central Asian people, and nomad nations in Chinese history and its economy is not yet fully studied. Central Asia is a missing link in world history.
Today Central Asia is regaining its independent position in the world. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of Chinese power, and the stationing of US armed forces ---all keep the balance of power in this region constantly changing. A serious “Great Game” has not yet started, but it is increasingly becoming important for major powers to have some stake in this region. For Japan, located in Asia and being a neighbor of Russia and China, it is vital to have a viable strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia.

Japan`s Strategy--an Oxymoron?
Strategy in Japan's foreign policy may sound like an oxymoron, because in the eyes of many Japanese, deprived of the capacity to project her will abroad by forcible means since 1945, Japan is not a full-fledged state. Her dependence on the US in security strengthens such an impression.
A unitary government typical of a “nation state” was not intrinsic for Japan through most of her history. Separated from the continent by the sea, Japan before the Meiji Restoration almost always enjoyed the leisure of living under dual or even triple centers of power: Emperor and aristocrats at one time, emperor and samurai at other times, and even emperor, samurai, and merchants at certain moments. The absolute power of the emperor and an articulate self-identification of Japan as a nation state---all these were new for Japan from 1868, and she adopted them to cope with the colonialist powers. Thus, Japan in the Meiji period began to formulate a clear national strategy: to achieve industrialization as quickly as possible and build strong armed forces to defend herself and, subsequently, to acquire overseas colonies. Eventually, she extended her sway through much of China, but she did not gain control over western areas that would have inserted her into border relations in Central Asia or face the Soviet Union’s domination there.
After World War II, Japan was deprived of military means to realize her interests overseas. However, this does not mean that postwar Japan did not possess any strategy. As long as a nation survives, she has her own interest and will, which can be realized by a "strategy": a scenario to achieve one's own goals. Japan's foreign policy after World War II was not as passive as some pundits assume. When Japan's intention does not go against US interests, she can pursue her own policy safely. One should not overlook the fact that Japan possesses a set of peaceful but effective means to promote her strategy. In fact Japanese diplomats abroad always enjoy substantial privileges emanating from the fact that Japan is the second largest economic power in the world. Access to the policy-makers is fairly easy, and third country diplomats are always attentive to what Japanese have to say. Economic power can be converted into political power, usually without much fanfare.
Many countries appreciate Japan's economic assistance program, because it is not merely donations of money, but a serious attempt to improve the economic and social infrastructure of developing nations. These countries do not hesitate in rendering support for Japan's international initiatives. What is more, Japan has a high degree of "soft power": the charm of her affluent and free society, and the appeal of her traditional as well as contemporary culture. Employing these means, Japan is capable of actively promoting her interests overseas, especially in Asia. In accordance with the "Fukuda Doctrine"　Japan helped the ASEAN countries` economic development, at the same time urging them to unite in regionalism. Today ASEAN is both politically and economically a viable entity. Japan established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1973 even before unification, irritating the US administration. After imposing sanctions in 1989 Japan was the first country to resume economic assistance to China, overriding criticism from the West that Japan neglected the human rights issue. When Cambodia held her first general election, Japan's political role was vital. These are some examples of an active foreign policy, drawing on soft power linked to substantial economic assistance.
It is true that Japan found it possible to realize her own strategy only within the confinement of the American grand strategy, but the end of the cold war and the surge of Chinese power have given the Japan-US alliance a more relative character. Japan now finds a more urgent need for strategic thinking on how to ensure a balance of power around herself, which would serve her security and prosperity. Her policy in Central Asia should constitute one of the links in such a strategy.
Japan, however, has been suffering from several constraints in realizing her own strategy. She could not establish an Asian Monetary Fund because of joint objections by the US and China, and she was unable to fully develop ties with Iran and Myanmar because of American objections. Each case was specific, but at the bottom lies America’s basic consideration: do not allow Japan to take the sole lead in Asia.
Japan has her own home-made limitations, too. For example, the prime minister and even the foreign minister are usually obliged to stay in Tokyo while the Diet is in session. When they go abroad, they have to ask for its consent. So these leaders can only rarely visit those areas of the world which are not deemed vital for Japan's interests, for example Central Asia, making Japan's foreign policy an "on-and-off diplomacy." Visits to such regions may rouse brief attention and create a false impression of Japan`s quasi-initiatives, but over the ensuing years the momentum can hardly be maintained merely by the efforts of Japanese diplomats.
The way of thinking of the majority of Japanese diplomats is such that changes and new trends in and outside of this country are not noticed and dealt with in a timely fashion. In their eyes, the order of importance of each region and country rarely changes. Each regional department of MOFA (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) acts independently. Usually it takes the intervention of the vice minister to coordinate the activities of the interested departments for one or another big diplomatic operation. Those diplomats who work on relations with Russia, for example, tend to solve issues solely on a bilateral basis without fully recognizing the fact that Japan's overall position vis-à-vis the US and Asia greatly affects Russia's attitude toward Japan.
Japanese diplomacy suffers from one more snag, too: stereotyped reporting by the international media. Even when Japan's initiatives are politically motivated, the international media often discerns only economic motives, thus reproducing the image that Japan is a mere vassal of the US and does not possess her own strategy. These constraints all apply to strategic thinking toward Central Asia.

Japan`s Diplomacy in Central Asia--the Start
Japan has been very ignorant about Central Asia, although the latter's cultural influence was conspicuous in ancient Japan. Under Soviet rule Central Asia grew even more remote in the eyes of the Japanese, becoming mixed up with the image of Russia. As the Japanese did not possess a positive view on the USSR, Central Asia was even more neglected because it was considered to be a mere "backward" part of the USSR.
When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker made a quick tour of the newly independent states of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), promising support and announcing the opening of US embassies. Japan opened her first embassies in Central Asia only in January 1993 (in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). Such a slow move reflects yet another drawback in Japanese diplomacy; the acute shortage of diplomats with a fair command of languages such as Russian. Also, opening a new embassy takes a long time; one can be opened only when an old embassy elsewhere is scrapped to restrain the overall number of embassies. What is more, the new Japanese ambassadors were left on their own because the officials in Tokyo did not have the capacity to pay enough attention to these new countries. The number of personnel and the budget were very limited, obliging the ambassadors themselves to draft cables to ask for more resources and attention.
In the first half of the nineties Kyrghyzstan drew the largest attention of the Japanese government. It became the first Central Asian country which a Japanese foreign minister visited. President Akayev at that time was considered to be the most reform-oriented among CIS leaders. It was assumed that because the economy is small, Japan`s assistance would be more effective, turning Kyrghyzstan into a showcase of Japan`s ODA, and, thus, greatly enhancing Japan`s position among CIS countries and Russia. That was the tacit calculation of Japanese officials at the time. However, it became clear that the Kyrghyz government was not prepared for implementation of large assistance projects, and gradually priority was transferred to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most populous Central Asian countries. If Kazakhstan is important due to her large oil reserves, Uzbekistan occupies a geopolitically vital place at the center of the Eurasian continent, possessing the largest political influence. Uzbekistan is regarded as the key country in Central Asia based on the reasoning that if the situation becomes unstable in this country, it will easily spread to neighboring states, affecting the balance of power in the eastern half of Eurasia.
Turkmenistan from an early stage also had drawn the attention of Japanese business because of its huge natural gas reserves; however, relations were slow to materialize and only in 2005 did Japan open its official liaison office in Ashkhabad. Toward the end of the civil war in Tajikistan Japan showed interest in the postwar settlement and economic development in that country. It was a way to lift Japan’s international position: rendering altruistic help for another state’s well-being. But its presence never became permanent in Tajikistan before the opening of a liaison office in 2002.
It is ironic that the less the attention a country draws, the easier it is to develop a coherent strategy vis-à-vis that part of the world. If a country has a strong bearing on one`s diplomacy, opinions may differ too much, making it hard to elaborate an articulate and consistent strategy. Central Asia for Japan is a case in point. A small number of high-ranking officials gradually formulated Japan`s policy vis-à-vis Central Asia. For Uzbekistan the role of MOF (the Ministry of Financial Affairs) officials is noteworthy. They visited Uzbekistan many times, not only because they were asked to come by the Japanese ambassador at the time and they had sympathy toward Uzbeks, but also because they clearly saw the geopolitical importance of Uzbekistan and its meaning in Japan`s foreign policy. For them Central Asia, located between China and Russia, is vital for maintenance of the balance of power and stability in eastern Eurasia, and if Japan established its footing there, she would get a card to play with China and Russia. For example T. Chino, Vice-Minister for Financial Affairs at that time, established friendly relations with President Karimov and government officials, giving frank advice for economic reforms. In 1994 Karimov made his first visit to Japan and by 1997 Japan had given about $500 million in soft loans and grants to Uzbekistan, making the latter a showcase of Japan's assistance in Central Asia.
She had to be cautious, though, so as not to incur criticism from the West that Japan provides easy money, ignoring human rights issues and the need to impose further economic reforms. Japanese society is one of the most democratic in the world, and human rights are well guarded. However, Japan was never hasty in spreading the values of democracy and freedom to other countries. Out of her own historical experience she knows very well that without economic development real democracy is hard to achieve. Therefore, her main efforts were directed toward construction of economic infrastructure in developing nations.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan was always in Japan`s sight. Her oil resources attracted the attention of Japanese business and her large geographical size, located between Russia and China, drew the attention of Japan’s MOFA. Watanabe Michio, Japanese Foreign Minister, made a visit to this country already in 1992, and Kazakh President Nazarbayev visited Japan in April 1994, one month ahead of Karimov. However, rich in oil resources, Kazakhstan was not enthusiastic about receiving Japanese economic assistance, which for Japan is one of the limited means to promote bilateral relations. It was only toward 1998 that Kazakhstan accepted a substantial Japanese soft loan. For many Japanese Kazakh officials seemed “haughty,” leading to preference to the Uzbeks who always received the Japanese very cordially.
The second wave of Japan`s involvement came with the announcement of "Silkroad Diplomacy." By 1997 Togo Kazuhiko, then Deputy Director-General of the Department of European and Oceanic Affairs, had realized the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia and proposed that Japan should not fall behind in filling the vacuum in this region. It was argued that Japan's clout there would benefit her diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia, China, and the Middle East, even if there was little specificity about what benefits actually might be realized. Togo’s department formulated three principles which were later named "Silkroad Diplomacy," and gradually started promulgating them. Toward the end of June and the beginning of July of 1997 Obuchi Keizo, a member of the Lower House who became prime minister in 1998, led a large delegation (approximately sixty people consisting of politicians, government officials, businessmen, and academics) to Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. His initiative, undertaken under the name of “Eurasian diplomacy,” must have been coordinated with the MOFA and the Prime Minister`s Office.
In July 1997 an indication came down from the Prime Minister's Office to give MOFA’s comments on a major speech on "Eurasian" diplomacy drafted by that office. The Department of European and Oceanic Affairs in one night summarized the office’s ideas, including “Silkroad Diplomacy” and revised the draft. The speech was delivered by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro to Keizai Doyukai on July 24. The speech also launched a new approach to Russia. This is a good example of how quick and dynamic Japan's foreign policy can be, when both the prime minister and the officials in charge happen to be innovative and imaginative, insofar as most major diplomatic policies are decided by the tandem of the Prime Minister`s Office and the MOFA.
“Silkroad Diplomacy” was highly lauded by countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. They anticipated not only Japan's ODA, but also her political involvement, which would dilute the effect of their overdependence on either Russia or the US. However, this was doomed to become yet another example of the "on-and-off diplomacy" of Japan. In July 1998 Akino Yutaka, political adviser for the UN monitoring operation in Tajikistan and well-regarded academic who toiled for the repatriation of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan, was murdered by local fighters. Soon after that Hashimoto had to step down as prime minister because of a defeat for the LDP in the Upper House elections. Almost at the same time there was a regular rotation in the MOFA, and the officials who had initiated the policy toward Central Asia moved elsewhere. Implementation of "Silkroad Diplomacy" was left to their successors, who achieved slow but steady progress. In May 1999 Minister for Foreign Affairs Komura Masahiko visited Uzbekistan. Liaison Offices were opened in Tajikistan in January 2002 and in Kyrghyzstan in January 2003. JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) opened its offices in Tashkent in 1999 and Kyrghyzstan in 2000 respectively, starting active support for reforms in these countries. VIP visits remained rare, but Japan`s footing in Central Asia grew (the Caucasus lagged behind, partly because Japan did not have any embassy until 2000 when she opened one in Azerbaijan). Japan by then had become the No.1 donor of ODA for Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, and Uzbekistan. She hosted in Tokyo a Consultative Group Meeting of donors for Tajikistan in 2001, inviting President Rakhmonov.
The Sept. 11 terrorist attack in New York and the ensuing battle in Afghanistan raised international attention for Central Asia. A large part of the humanitarian aid by the UN went to Afghanistan via Central Asia. This was largely financed by Japan and was supervised by Oshima Kenzo, then Deputy Director-General of the UN. Simultaneously, the Japanese government conferred more than $20 million of urgent grants to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. They were used for importing capital goods, which were vital for the economic development and political stability of these countries. In Tajikistan, for example, combines, tractors, and other agricultural machinery were imported from Uzbekistan, Russia, and Ukraine.
In July 2002 Sugiura Seiken, Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a tour of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, heading an energy mission. This was done on the initiative of the MOFA, which attempted to draw the attention of Japanese business to this part of the world. However, economic considerations have been playing a marginal role in relations with Central Asia. The total volume of trade in 2003 was merely $446 million (about 0.5％ of Japan's foreign trade), and Japanese companies had not invested much money in this region because it is landlocked and business there is subject to many inconveniences, the remnant of the rigid socialist economy. The energy mission produced few concrete results.

Toward Multilateralism: Central Asia Plus Japan
In late July 2002 President Karimov paid his second visit to Japan. He had visited Washington D.C. in March and had signed a document on "Strategic Partnership" with the US. Having decided to provide the Hanabad base for use by the American Air Force, he shifted the pivot of his foreign policy to the US and Japan. Probably he calculated that in this way he would be able to thwart the Russian imperialistic intention to subjugate Central Asia again, and that thanks to lucrative financial aid by Japan and the US Uzbekistan would be able to accomplish a smooth transformation into a market economy. Karimov proposed to Japan to agree to a similar "Strategic Partnership" and a separate document on economic cooperation. In the first document Japan was urged to contribute to the security of Uzbekistan. As ambassador to Uzbekistan at the time, I had the impression that the initiative to conclude such a document came directly from Karimov, although most officials in his government were skeptical whether Japan could make a real contribution to Uzbek security. Karimov, for his part, was probably eager to draw political benefit from Japan's economic assistance, which he had come to highly esteem by that time.
Japan's assistance in the construction of infrastructure in Uzbekistan (Japan's yen loan was used for laying a vast network of optic fiber lines across the country, modernization of local airports, opening tens of vocational colleges, construction of a factory to repair old railway wagons, construction of a huge power plant, etc.) promoted the economy, thus enhancing political stability. It allowed Uzbekistan to secure her departure from colonialist subjugation. Karimov was aware that Japan does not possess any imperialist ambition vis-à-vis Central Asia, seeing it as a safe and reliable force for avoiding overdependence either on Russia or the US. He pursued a political goal even in the economy, asking for Japan's yen loan for construction of a new railway which will reduce dependence on Russia and Turkmenistan and will open a new transportation route to the Persian Gulf via Afghanistan.
In Japan, however, the implementation of these agreements was left to the mercy of diplomats and other government officials. The Central Asian desk of the MOFA again had to engage in an obstacle course to gain the attention of higher officials and obtain financial and other resources. When I replaced Nakayama Kyoko in 2002 as ambassador to Uzbekistan, I did not possess enough connections. She had come from the Ministry of Finance and enjoyed the support also of the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation. I could count only on the MOFA for promotion of my ideas. In the renamed Ministry of Financial Affairs the situation was changing. A new generation of officials did not share the passionate view on Uzbekistan of their predecessors, such as Chino. Their priority was to follow the line of the IMF and the World Bank, which became increasingly dubious about Uzbek performance in human rights and economic reforms. The general atmosphere in MOFA too was not positive toward Central Asia, an unknown newcomer in world politics and a "mere part of the former Soviet Union." The Central Asia desk tried to realize a visit either of the prime minister or the minister of foreign affairs to the region, but their attempts were always thwarted by other departments, which proposed "more urgent and more important" visits elsewhere. The yen loan for construction of the new railway in Uzbekistan was finally approved only in August of 2004.
At the same time, a new idea was fermenting among interested Japanese diplomats. By the autumn of 2003 new people had taken charge of Central Asia in the MOFA and welcomed new ideas. As ambassador, I suggested to Uzbek officials that regional integration such as ASEAN would serve the interests of all Central Asian countries in strengthening their political independence and economies. My colleagues in other Central Asian countries and in the Tokyo home office were also reaching a similar idea independently. This thinking found a unified, concrete form when the first Central Asian ambassadorial meeting was held in Tashkent in September 2003 with the participation of high-ranking officials from the home office. All participants expressed support when an idea was floated to establish a forum "Central Asia plus Japan" and to strengthen multilateralism and regional coordination, if not integration, in the region. When Uzbek Foreign Minister at that time Sadyk Safaev paid his first official visit to Japan in December 2003, this idea was formally conveyed to him by the Foreign Minister at that time Kawaguchi Yoriko. Simultaneously, Japan`s MOFA started coordination with other Central Asian states to launch a joint forum "Central Asia plus Japan."
The future form of Japan`s involvement in Central Asian affairs was much discussed among Japanese officials at that time. One possibility was to take part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the consensus among Japanese officials was that if Japan joined this mechanism as the only non-socialist country, she might end up being used by other members, and without the involvement of Western countries SCO will not become an effective organization. Another possibility was to hold a joint meeting with the CACO (Central Asian Cooperation Organization). However, as CACO did not seem a reliable body and, meanwhile, Russia was accepted as member in May 2004, the only choice for Japan was to launch a new forum “Central Asia plus Japan.” The model was ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China, and South Korea). This form ensures flexibility for Japan, because it does not close the door for others, while for the time being there was no necessity for cumbersome coordination with a large number of participants. The Department of European and Oceanic Affairs gradually began lobbying to have the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi go to Central Asia in the summer of 2004, the typical season for Japan`s diplomacy.
In August 2004 Kawaguchi made official visits to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrghyzstan. In Tashkent she delivered a major speech in front of the local dignitaries and foreign representatives, presenting three principles in dealing with Central Asian countries: respect for diversity, a cooperative rivalry, and openness to the participation of third parties. Kawaguchi articulately called for further democratization and economic reforms, cautioning the conservative forces in an unusually blunt tone from attempting to guard their vested interests under the guise of "tradition." On August 28 she held a joint meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, with the ministers of foreign affairs of all the Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan (These ministers were in Astana for a regular meeting of the CACO; however, they met Kawaguchi independent of this framework.) The ensuing Joint Statement declared that Japan and the four Central Asian countries had agreed to launch the new forum, "Central Asia plus Japan.”
Kawaguchi did not resort to the notorious "check-book diplomacy" and did not announce any spectacular aid package. This was a rare example where Japan's working level officials elaborated a coherent strategy to create a new international framework. The general lack of interest in Central Asia brought an opportunity, where MOFA officials could create an articulate new initiative without help from the Prime Minister's Office. This was not subject to attentive discussion in the Diet or even close attention from the mass media, either. Thus, the initiative was coherent, but at the same time fragile.

A Fndamental Change after the Andijan Incident
On May 13, 2005 a group of armed intruders assaulted a prison in Andijan to free the inmates. In ensuing events a large number of citizens were shot to death. The EU and the US, to different degrees, blamed the Uzbek authorities for shooting the unarmed citizens, whereas Russia and China openly defended the actions of the Uzbek government. Japan took a cautious approach and urged the Uzbek government to provide a more plausible explanation about the cause and the outcome of the incident. Japan did not publicly denounce the Uzbek authorities.
On July 6 the SCO held its annual summit in Almaty, and all participants demanded in their Joint Declaration that the US define more clearly how long its armed forces intend to use the bases in Central Asia, inasmuch as the situation in Afghanistan was heading toward stability and the mission of the American armed forces was being fulfilled. Later, on July 29 the Uzbek government sent a blunt diplomatic note to the American Embassy in Tashkent, urging it to withdraw all US forces within six months. By November all US troops and airplanes left the Uzbek territory, and soon after that Karimov flew to Moscow and signed a treaty on mutual security. Uzbek foreign policy has made a turnabout.
For some years the world media had been talking about a new “Great Game” in Central Asia. However, it is noteworthy that no big power other than Russia has a vital interest in this region. As Russian influence remained limited after the fall of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum resulted. Without a serious caretaker Central Asia was becoming an orphan in world politics. The US has not been able to formulate an unequivocal policy toward Central Asia, being incapable to synthesize various considerations: the oil in Kazakhstan, the need to secure the use of military bases for operations in Afghanistan, and aspirations to spread democracy and a market economy. China has a burning desire for energy resources in Central Asia, but her political ambition for dominance is not yet fully visible. Moreover, China still lacks the capacity to project her influence in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which do not share common borders with China. Her culture and the mentality of the people are much different from the ones in Central Asia, which is still under the legacy of past Russian influence.
The EU has a tendency to try to expand its cultural, economic, and (eventually) political spheres, and Central Asia is no exception. Central Asia is the only area in the world where both the ADB (Asian Development Bank) and the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) are active. The EU countries have been rendering substantial economic assistance and advice; yet, they face severe commercial competition, and their hands tend to be tied by their own domestic public opinion which denounces assistance to authoritarian regimes. India, Iran, and Turkey all have strong historical ties with Central Asia and have reinstated their interest in this region; yet their capacity to project influence is still limited. Japan`s economic assistance plays a substantial role in Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but her involvement in Central Asia still lacks general understanding and support in her own society. She does not possess serious weight in either politics and security affairs in this region.
Therefore, a real “New Great Game” had not started yet in Central Asia, when the rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia substantially changed the political map in Central Asia. But before going into this strategic reorientation, we need to take a glance back at the background of the remarkable shift in Uzbek foreign policy.
One has to note that even before the Andijan incident the US and Russia had been gradually changing places in the eyes of the Uzbeks. If America in the past posed as liberator and generous financier for Central Asian countries, today the authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union had come to be wary of the US, which may attempt to topple their regime for the sake of democracy and reforms. Sensing the intentions of the Americans, Uzbekistan had begun a new tilt toward Russia. Upset by the fact that the US did not pay them enough for their independent policy from Russia and the introduction of economic reforms, the authorities turned　to Russia, which could provide some money from her huge new oil income, and, more importantly, would not attempt to topple the government. In 2005 the Uzbek army for the first time after the fall of the Soviet Union engaged in a joint exercise with the Russian armed forces.
Russia gladly took advantage of this situation and even touted herself as a bridgehead of political freedom and economic reforms. The Uzbek elite, eager to maintain their position from the days of the Soviet Union, welcomed the return of Russia, which they still consider as the center of civilization. Russia looks attractive to the common people in Central Asia as well. Expectations that someday an American would knock on their door to offer lucrative help never came true, and what is more the US imposes, in their eyes, a foreign culture which is not compatible with theirs. If in the US the people from Central Asia are generally not reckoned with, in Russia they are still somehow recognized and it is easier for the Uzbeks to do business in Russia. Their knowledge of Russian and Russian mores contrasts with weak knowledge of the English language and American ways of thinking. The Andijan incident and the conclusion of a security pact between Uzbekistan and Russia have made this tendency decisive. If the US wants to keep her influence in Central Asia, she will need a more cohesive and consistent policy than up to now.
China`s political role in Central Asia is on the rise too. Shortly after the Andijan incident Karimov flew to Beijing for an official visit as scheduled, and China publicly announced her support for the Uzbek government in its handling of the Andijan incident. China in the Joint Declaration of the SCO objected to the location of American armed forces in Central Asia. In this way, the world was made to understand that China is a natural player in Central Asia and that the US is an outsider.
China has become attractive as a donor of economic assistance, too. In the 2004 SCO summit Hu Jintao announced that China is going to offer Central Asia soft loans in the amount of $900 million. Representatives of Chinese oil and natural gas companies frequently visit Central Asia in quest of resources, promising to finance a wide range of projects. China`s status is on the rise in Central Asia, and it is interesting to see how long Russia can continue its collusion with China against the US. A new “Great Game” may well start between China and Russia.

Redefinition of Interests ---toward Establishment of a Central Asian version of ARF
After the fall of the Soviet empire Central Asian countries were urged to reform themselves to introduce democracy and a market economy, both of which　only gradually took root in Western Europe and America, taking much time and bloodshed. Any attempt to achieve these two goals in a short time would lead to total chaos, as was the case in Russia in the early 1990s. Therefore, Central Asian countries merely vacillated between major powers depending upon when and what they provide. In their eyes there was no country in the world on whose assistance they can totally rely in order to jump into an unknown world of freedom and democracy. Now, having seen that the US does not possess a coherent strategy for the benefit of the current leaders in the region, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have made decisive their tilt toward Russia. Kyrghyztan may soon follow suit. The lacuna created by the break-up of the Soviet Union is now being filled by Russia, which raises the following questions.
Firstly, the Central Asian countries will have to discuss really well what their true interests are. Their dependence on Russia entails a danger of renewed subjugation in view of the unchanged attitude of the majority of the Russians toward Central Asia as their legitimate outpost. The absence of American influence might someday allow a wanton rivalry between Russia and China, which would harm security in this region. In any case Central Asian countries have to achieve democratization and market economy for their own sake.
Secondly, Japan, the US, and the EU need to redefine their interests and goals in this region. They may well leave this region at the mercy of the rivalry among major regional powers, but then their influence in the eastern half of the Eurasian continent will be substantially reduced. China may possess some political weight in Kyrghyztan, but in other Central Asian countries her influence is largely limited to economics. Most Chinese today cannot speak Russian, the common language in the ex-Soviet sphere, and their mentality is different in spite of some racial resemblance. China will be accepted in Central Asia as long as and as much as it pays money to them. Russia, too, although she gladly accepted the overture of Karimov, will not be able to shoulder all the expenses which are needed to maintain stability and develop economies in Central Asia.
All these facts indicate the necessity for serious international cooperation. In Europe the CSCE greatly contributed to securing the status quo and security in the region. In Southeast and East Asia, on a more tentative basis, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) has been addressing similar questions with the participation of Japan, China, the US, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and other countries. Central Asia has the SCO, but its terms of reference is mainly economy and its main financier is China. Russia might not be so happy about China’s growing stake in Central Asia. Therefore, to embark upon a more rapid construction of economic infrastructure and to ensure the security, solving the dilemma of Sino-Russian rivalry, Central Asia would need either to enlarge the SCO to include Japan, the US, and the EU or to establish a new international framework like ARF with more than security considerations. Obviously such an initiative should originate from the Central Asian countries themselves.
Until recently the Japanese Government was considering initiating a broad program of infrastructure building, the effect of which would encompass the territory of several Central Asian countries. It will be started with smaller technical assistance, and with a view to incorporate Afghanistan into the regional cooperation. Such an undertaking would accelerate the tendency to deeper integration among Central Asian states, an outcome to be welcomed in Japan. The Central Asian version of ARF, which so far remains as author’s personal idea, might well incorporate the Japanese initiative under its umbrella.
The Central Asian countries should resume their efforts for genuine democratization and economic reform, and the industrialized countries should continue to help them, keeping in mind the following specifics in Central Asia. In ex-socialist states, namely countries where all (but limited) resources were monopolized by the state, there is no real basis for a democratic opposition. The medieval despotism augmented by Russian and Soviet autocracy engendered an atmosphere in which both the elite and the masses do not listen to a “democratic” leader. They tend to consider such a leader to be weak, an invitation to unhampered fighting to extract as much as possible. Some intellectuals aspire to freedom and democracy, but the common people do not support them, suspecting, often correctly, that the intellectuals are concerned only with their own liberty and well-being. In the opinion of the masses the national wealth should not be monopolized by private persons. Only public ownership of property would guarantee the people`s well-being, they believe.
Under these circumstances, any opposition leaders, after toppling an authoritarian regime, may well end up establishing yet another authoritarian and corrupt government, dividing up property for their own advantage. Unlike some Americans who assume that these conditions do not stand in the way of vigorous efforts to impose democracy and a market economy, Japanese tend to be cautious in pressing for far-reaching reforms that do not take these conditions into account.
The world should possess a more exact knowledge about Central Asian society. The Andijan incident, for example, might have been caused not by religious extremism (as the Uzbek authorities claim) or by the “widespread dissatisfaction of the people with the slow pace in economic reforms” (as some Western media claim). Islam in Central Asia is in general moderate, and fanaticism is rare. People are dissatisfied not with the “slow pace” of economic reforms, but with the early results of the reforms: a constant rise in communal payments and unemployment because of the breakup of collective farms. In this vein the background of the Andijan incident may have been not so much ideological as materialistic. This area is prone to illegal import of Chinese commodities and illegal export of Uzbek cotton and oil, and may be involved in narcotics traffic. The change of the Andijan local governor and the ensuing attempt to revamp the local economic interests may well have served as a trigger of the Andijan incident.
All this suggests that the world community should be more careful in approaching the ex-socialist states. Many reforms, contrary to the general understanding in the West, are not welcomed by the local people who are accustomed to be taken care of by their government. Usually fewer than ten percent of the total population is eager to start their own ventures, utilizing newly acquired freedom (and in many cases their initiative tends to be stymied by envy and suspicion in the society and extortion by the officials). A hasty attempt to enforce reforms will exacerbate the economic hardship, bringing political chaos in which quasi “opposition” politicians engage in an endless battle for ownership of the properties. A serious discussion is needed to reexamine the development strategies of the ex-socialist countries.
Central Asia as one of the centers of world history deserves independence, and its people deserve a better and more democratic way of life. Japan would be willing to help them to achieve these goals inasmuch as the presence of an integrated power in this region independent of outside control would serve the interests of Japan. Even if Japan may adjust her policy to the region now, her long-term objectives are likely to endure. Japan’s strategy is not limited to a trade promotion. She is always endeavoring to enhance her international position in general, sometimes even in remote areas. The development of ASEAN is a remarkable showcase of the success of Japan’s diplomacy, economic assistance and direct investments. The smooth democratization in Cambodia was facilitated by Japan’s involvement, too. In Central Asia, where the rivalry among big powers will end up with creating a stalemate, Japan may well serve as an impartial balancer and an initiator of multilateral mechanism for security and development of this region.

Addendum: Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit
In　June 2006 the second joint meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of “Central　 Asia plus Japan” was held in Tokyo. Turkmenistan did not send a delegate, but this time　 Afghanistan was represented. This proactive gesture by Japan drew the attention of　 some foreign media, the more so because it took place just one week before the SCO’s　 annual summit.
Shortly afterwards Koizumi asked MOFA to arrange an official　trip to Central Asia. A farewell visit to the U.S. was approaching, and the feud over Yasukuni made a visit to Japan’s direct neighbors impossible. Central Asia, because of its “freshness” in the eyes of the Japanese public (there had been no visit by a Japanese prime minister to this region) and prevalent pro-Japanese attitudes, was a natural choice for him.
The visit was brief (August 28-30 to Astana, Tashkent and Samarkand), and Koizumi did not engage in “checkbook” diplomacy. He reiterated Japan’s interest in energy resources, including uranium, but did not go beyond giving his blessing to what private companies had been doing.
The visit was the culmination of the policy symbolized by the forum “Central Asia and Japan,” which appealed to the Central Asian countries for more unity among themselves, open cooperation with all interested third parties, and further democratization and economic reform.　
Koizumi’s visit coincided with moves by the U.S. and EU. Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State had visited Uzbekistan at the beginning of August. Soon refugees from Andijan were repatriated apparently without any repression. The EU also had sent a high-level delegation to Uzbekistan in late August. These moves are not closely orchestrated, but they reflect a change in the general atmosphere vis-à-vis Uzbekistan.
Japan does not have any intention to challenge the influence of Russia and China in this region but wants to have her own voice heard there, too. Koizumi’s visit coincided with yet another positive move. On September 2 the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan held an informal summit in Astana and declared that they are going to accelerate intra-regional cooperation. This group had not met by itself at least since 2004 when the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) admitted Russia as a member. Following this meeting Karimov switched his visit to Kazakhstan into a bilateral state visit, overtly demonstrating his friendship with Nazarbayev. Thus, Koizumi left a legacy of rising hopes in relations with Central Asia.__